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ABSTRACT
This dissertation examines resource-based, strategic group, and industry
influences on firm performance. The resource-based view o f the firm and strategic
groups research are two areas o f organizational inquiry that have lacked both theoretical
as well as empirical integration. This dissertation provides a critical first step towards
that end. Three papers are presented that first develop - and then test - resource-based
and strategic group influences on organizational performance. The primary findings of
this dissertation are threefold. First, variance in organizational performance exists both
within and between strategic groups. Second, the degree to which firm, group, and
industry explained variance in organizational performance varied based upon
performance measure. Third, in all cases, firms accounted for the lion’s share o f the
variation in organizational performance. In conclusion, the key determinant o f
organizational performance is manager’s capabilities to position their firm within their
group as well as industry.
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INTRODUCTION
The purpose o f this dissertation is to enhance strategic management research by
improving our understanding o f how various decisions, processes, and environmental
forces influence firm performance. Developing an understanding o f how to achieve
superior firm performance continues to be one of the primary goals o f strategic
management researchers (March and Sutton, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990).
Specific factors affecting firm performance stem from a bewildering array of influences
including differences in firm resources (Barney, 1991; Wemerfelt, 1984), the industry
environments where firms operate (Dess & Beard, 1984; Porter, 1980), and influences
emanating from within industry subsets o f firms — referred to as strategic groups (Hunt,
1972; Porter, 1979). These multiple factors influence how firms differ, and how those
differences effect firm performance (Carroll, 1993; Nelson, 1991).
In this dissertation I take the position that understanding firm performance can
best be accomplished by examining firm characteristics in the context o f the
environments where they operate (Meyer, 1991; Rumelt, Schendel, & Teece, 1994;
Summer et al., 1990). Thus, the goal o f this dissertation is to build and test theory
concerning multiple, multilevel influences on firm performance. I accomplish this goal
by conceptually developing and empirically testing influences on firm performance
derived from the firm, strategic group, and industry levels o f analysis. To rigorously
accomplish this broad goal, the organization of this dissertation is as follows. I will
present three papers that first develop and then test firm, strategic group, and industry
influences on firm performance. I will now briefly describe each paper’s content and
research goals.

l
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The first paper in this dissertation is a conceptual treatise that meets at the
crossroads between two o f strategic management’s most investigated frameworks: the
resource-based view o f the firm and strategic groups research. Historically, assumptions
behind these two views have put them somewhat at odds conceptually. Because the
resource-based view o f the firm argues that sustained competitive advantage is best
attained when firms have unique resources (Barney, 1991; Wemerfelt, 1984), this view
argues that analyzing differences in individual firm resources is the best strategy for
understanding performance differences. In contrast, strategic groups research argues that
a number o f firms within the same industry can achieve sustained profitability if their
strategies are similar to each other, but distinct from other industry members (Porter,
1979). Thus, this view argues that understanding differences in firm performance is best
accomplished by conducting analyses at the within-industry group level o f analysis.
Recent work in strategic groups research has begun to bridge the gap between these two
theories by suggesting that firm differences exist both within and between strategic
groups (e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1988). That is, any given firm can closely follow the
basic recipe that defines a strategic group and be a “core” member of that group, or
loosely follow the group recipe and be a “secondary” group member (Reger & Huff,
1993). The goal o f this conceptual paper is to develop propositions concerning
contingencies when firm differences, group processes or both may lead to sustained
competitive advantage. As well, I will provide implications for practitioners, as well as
suggestions for future theory building and empirical tests combining the resource-based
view and strategic groups research.

2
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The second paper in this dissertation builds on the conceptual work above by
testing organizational resource and strategic group influences on performance on a
sample of hospitals during a time o f considerable environmental change. I draw data
from a single industry to provide a rich description o f phenomena in an environment that
has previously confirmed the existence of strategic groups. This empirical paper
advances the field by simultaneously testing performance influences stemming from both
the resource-based view o f the firm and strategic groups research. I first hypothesize that
both organizational and strategic group levels o f analysis explain meaningful variance in
hospital performance. Next, I hypothesize that strategic group characteristics will effect
performance above and beyond organizational resources. Finally, I hypothesize that the
effects of organizational resources will be more moderated by group characteristics.
To test strategic group performance influences I will derive strategic groups by
clustering hospitals based on two variables indicating strategy type: source o f competitive
advantage and breadth o f operations. By clustering, I am able to estimate group level
variables that may explain organizational performance (e.g., average group operations
breadth). I will test performance influences from multiple levels of analysis by using a
hierarchical linear modeling technique (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997).
Specifically, this paper will use the HLM/2L statistical package (HLM: Bryk,
Raudenbush, & Congdon, 1996) to partition the amount of variance in hospital
performance that is explained by organizational and group levels o f analysis. HLM also
directly tests the main effects strategic group characteristics (i.e., source o f competitive
advantage) have on performance, and the moderating effects strategic group
characteristics play in hospital resource — performance relationships.

3
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The third and final paper seeks to investigate a more generalizable model by
examining firms in multiple industries with data drawn from the COMPUSTAT database.
While the hospitals sample data allows for a rich investigation with high internal validity,
provides well-formulated strategic groups, and controls for industry differences, drawing
from a single context compromises the generalizability o f study findings. By examining
multiple industries, the third paper builds on the second paper (i.e., hospital sample) by
rigorously examining other contextual factors that may influence a firm’s ability to
achieve superior performance. Notable environmental influences stem from industry
differences (Porter, 1980). I hypothesize three specific industry influences affecting
strategic group influences on firm performance: Resource abundance (i.e., munificence),
volatility (i.e., dynamism), and complexity (cf. Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988;
Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). To analyze the effects o f multiple level influences on firm
performance simultaneously, I will use the HLM/3L statistical package to assess the
amount of variance in firm performance that is explained by the firm, strategic group, and
industry levels of analysis. As well, multiple independent predictor variables will be
included at each level o f analysis to shed light on why one level may be more influential
than others. While it is widely accepted that both firm resources and environmental traits
play a role in determining firm performance (Henderson and Mitchell, 1997; Mauri and
Michaels, 1998; McGahan and Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Rumelt, 1991), this study is
the first to test firm, strategic group, and industry influences in a single model. In sum,
this study is undertaken to enhance the generalizability of the findings in my dissertation
while simultaneously providing insights about how industry characteristics as well as
strategic group membership influence firm performance.

4
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This dissertation contributes to the field o f strategic management both
theoretically and empirically by explicitly examining the determinants o f firm
performance from a multilevel perspective. It contributes theoretically by juxtaposing
resource-based and strategic group influences on firm performance. This research
contributes methodologically by testing multilevel influences on firm performance in an
explicitly multilevel model using a methodology that has yet to be applied to the strategic
management literature. Finally, the dissertation answers the call from researchers who
have advocated integrating the resource-based view o f the firm with strategic groups
research (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992), and testing influences of firm and contextual
factors in a single model (Dranove, Peteraf, & Shanley, 1998; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Rouse
& Daellenbach, 1999; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a).

5
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THE DETERMINANTS OF FIRM PERFORMANCE: COUPLING
STRATEGIC GROUP AND RESOURCE-BASED VIEWS
A top priority for strategic management researchers is to develop a better
understanding of the decisions, actions, and processes that lead to superior firm
performance (March & Sutton, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). The strategic
management field is set apart from related disciplines by the incorporation o f multiple
theoretical perspectives to aid in answering interesting and practical research questions
such as the determinants o f firm performance (Jemison, 1981a; Meyer, 1991). The
application of multiple theoretical approaches can provide the basis for rich descriptions
o f organizational antecedents, actions, and outcomes (Combs & Ketchen, 1999).
The resource-based view o f the firm (RBV) and strategic groups research (SGR)
are two perspectives on organizations that have received considerable attention within the
last decade (e.g., Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Reger & Huff, 1993; Rouse
& Daellenbach, 1999). The RBV argues that differences in firm resources and
capabilities provide the basis for superior firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993;
Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984). In
the long run, the most profitable firms are able to attract resources that are valuable, rare,
difficult to imitate and without substitutes (Barney, 1991). From this perspective, firms
differ in their abilities to acquire and deploy resources needed for sustained competitive
advantage.
SGR focuses on sets o f firms within the same industry that follow similar
strategies (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1979, 1980; Reger & Huff,
1993; Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988). Membership in a strategic group can be an
important contextual influence, altering interpretations, actions, and ultimately

6
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performance (Dranove et al., 1998; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993).
Under this view, firms need not be uniquely different in their resources and actions to
attain above average performance within an industry.
There is considerable appeal in pairing SGR with the conceptual framework of
the RBV. While the goal o f both views is to explain firm performance, they have
traditionally offered different prescriptions for achieving superior profitability. The RBV
seeks to understand how the accumulation of unique resources is responsible for creating
superior firm performance. In contrast, the theoretical models that underlie SGR have
traditionally assumed that groups o f firms can achieve above-average industry
performance despite similarities in terms of strategies and strategically relevant resources
(Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Porter, 1980, 1981; Rumelt, 1984; Scherer, 1980). While
both views share the perspective that firms position themselves so that their strategies are
difficult to imitate, they differ in their basic recipes for deterring imitation. The RBV
argues that individual firms use “isolating mechanisms” to frustrate imitation o f their
unique strategy (Rumelt, 1984). In contrast, advocates of SGR believe that subsets of
firms within an industry may generate superior performance when mobility barriers
hinder strategy imitation by industry competitors (Hunt, 1972; Mascarenhas & Aaker,
1989; Porter, 1979). Despite the aforementioned differences, the belief that firm
performance is dependent upon manager’s decisions is germane to both views. For
example, supporters o f the RBV acknowledge firm performance is influenced by
managerial choices, social competencies, and aspirations (Ginsberg, 1994). Likewise,
strategic group theorists contend that firm superiority is partly a function o f manager’s
efforts to place their firm within a strategic group and to look towards group performance

7
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levels when setting aspiration levels (Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Peteraf & Shanley,
1997). Thus, while significant rationales separate these views, they are not altogether
incompatible.
Neither perspective, used in isolation, has provided the “answer” for why some
firms outperform others. Hence, simultaneous consideration o f the RBV and SGR has
the potential to yield considerable insights about how firms can achieve superior
performance within their competitive environments (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rouse
& Daellenbach, 1999). To progress towards that end, the goal o f this paper is to work
toward integration o f these two perspectives’ disparate insights on the determinants of
firm performance. To further this goal I briefly review the RBV and SGR. I then offer
propositions about how both firm resources, strategic group characteristics, or both
influence strategic actions and outcomes. I conclude with implications for organizational
decision-makers and guidance for future research.
Literature Review
Review of the Resource Based Perspective
The central tenet of the RBV is that superior firm performance is a function o f the
firm’s ability to both accumulate and deploy scarce resources (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt,
1984). Resources can refer to specific assets as well as human competencies and
intangible abilities (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Under this view, resource
accumulation is based on managers’ rationally guided motives for efficiency,
effectiveness and profitability (Conner, 1991; Oliver, 1997). Acquisition barriers
associated with resource accumulation may yield long-term advantages for firms (Amit &

8
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Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986b; Penrose, 1959). Ideally, firm resources will lead to
sustained competitive advantage when they are valuable, rare, without substitutes, and
bundled in a manner so that the firm’s resources, and thus strategies, are inimitable by
current and future competitors (Barney, 1991).
In a field that has historically lacked a distinct paradigm, the RBV has emerged as
a central perspective in strategic management (Conner, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992;
Peteraf, 1993; Wemerfelt, 1995). The RBV has improved our understanding o f
diversification (Markides & Williamson, 1996), human resource systems (Lado &
Wilson, 1994), organizational culture (Barney, 1986a; Fiol, 1991), strategic networks
(Gulati, 1999), strategic regulation (Maijoor & Van Witteloostuijn, 1996) in addition to
firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989;
Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
Although the RBV has become the cornerstone for building understanding about
competitive advantage in the field of strategic management (Peteraf, 1993), the basis for
this perspective is by no means novel. Economists have long relied on a similar concept
o f Ricardian rents that can be generated from ownership o f valuable land, labor, capital,
and entrepreneurial abilities (Ricardo, 1817). The RBV is also similar to SWOT analysis
in which strategy formulation progresses by analyzing the “fit” between a firm’s
positioning o f its internal strengths and weaknesses with the environment’s external
opportunities and threats (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980). Originating at the
Harvard Business School, this ‘design’ school o f thought is based on the premise that
firms are idiosyncratic. Hence, performance can best be studied by analyzing a firm’s
unique characteristics and traits (Mintzberg, 1990).

9
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In sum, the RBV assumes firm performance is a function o f holding and
deploying unique resources. Desiring to equip their firms with scarce resources that will
lead to superior performance, managerial choices drive the resource accumulation
process. This view is well documented in the strategic management literature, and draws
from classic economic thought as well. Although the RBV reflects a rich industrial
organization economics heritage, this theory is distinct from other economic theories
because it is relevant at the firm, not industry level o f analysis and because the RBV
argues that firm resource combinations can result in persistent above-average
performance (Conner, 1991).
Review of Strategic Groups Research
Economists have long held that performance is essentially an industry construct
(Bain, 1956; Mason, 1939). Researchers in strategic management, who hold that firm
differences are critical for understanding performance, have challenged this notion
(Barney, 1991; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Rumelt, 1991). The allure of
conventional industry analysis has been further tarnished by the introduction o f the
strategic group concept. SGR originated in Hunt’s (1972) dissertation that found firms in
the US appliance industry could be grouped based on differences in vertical integration,
product diversification, and product differentiation. Firms within the industry faced
different competitive threats depending on group membership. Arising from this early
work, SGR is based on the premise that profits differ systematically among groups o f
firms within an industry because o f market factors and similar asset profiles that are
common to groups o f firms (Porter, 1979). Porter (1980: 129) defines a strategic group
as a “group o f firms in an industry following the same or a similar strategy”. Cool and

to
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Schendel (1987: 1106) apply a more general definition and describe strategic groups as
“firms competing within an industry on the basis o f similar resource combinations of
scope and resource commitments.” Despite differences in semantics, researchers agree
that strategic groups are naturally occurring subsets o f firms that are more homogeneous
in actions than other industry incumbents (Cool & Schendel, 1988).
The allure o f studying strategic groups is that within an industry some groups may
consistently outperform others. Indeed, a number o f studies have found evidence for this
assertion (e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996; Nath &
Gruca, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993). Group performance is generally attributed to
strategic group mobility barriers (Porter, 1980). Mobility barriers are structural attributes
o f the group that make group membership difficult (i.e., costly)(Caves & Porter, 1977).
Examples include factors such as scale economies, access to distribution channels, or
advertising and capital intensity at the group level (Porter, 1979). Attaining group
membership is also difficult because firms within a group are mutually interdependent,
therefore they anticipate, monitor, and react to fellow group member’s actions accurately
and quickly relative to non-group members (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Porter, 1979).
Resource-based vs. Strategic Groups Research: Assumptions and Implications
Before juxtaposing these two theories, it may be useful to contrast their basic
assumptions (Bacharach, 1989). If the assumptions underlying two theories are
fundamentally incompatible, any attempt toward pairing the two views is impossible. If
fundamental assumptions are not at odds, however, pairing the two views can be fruitful
(Bacharach, 1989). The RBV and SGR are both the offspring o f economic research, and
they hold similar assumptions in other important areas. First, performance is the key

11
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dependent variable. Second, both perspectives argue that managers aspire to make
rational decisions. Third, both views argue that superior performance is achieved when
managers position their firms in such a manner so that strategy imitation is difficult.
Under the RBV, managers endeavor to create “isolating mechanisms” that protect
individual firms from imitation and thereby preserve their high performance (Rumelt,
1984). Under SGR, however, “mobility barriers” serve to separate similar acting groups
o f firms in an industry (Caves & Porter, 1977; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989). The higher
the mobility barrier, the greater the group’s ability to prevent imitation and the greater the
potential for high profits by group members (Porter, 1979).
Despite the similarities between the RBV and SGR just mentioned, the
prescriptive implications o f these two views are somewhat at odds. The RBV asserts that
firms should strive to position themselves in such a manner so that no other firm can
duplicate their unique resource bundle. In contrast, SGR suggests that commonalties
across firms can be good. Mutual interdependence among firms may allow insulation
from rivalry because some groups have superior bargaining power with buyers and
suppliers, and face less o f a threat from substitute products in other industries (Dranove et
al., 1998; Porter, 1980). In this view, firm resource bundles will be unique between
groups, but similar within.
Pairing these two views can be accomplished by examining how managers’
choices and actions drive the accumulation o f idiosyncratic firm resources as well as
decisions about competitive position within a strategic group. While the collective
beliefs o f organizational members about how a firm is unique can play a critical role in
organizational interpretations and actions (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dutton & Dukerich,
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1991), managers also perceive and respond to firms that are similar in strategy (Peteraf &
Shanley, 1997; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Porter, 1980). Thus, both
individual and group processes may influence interpretations, actions, and outcomes.
While little has been done to conceptually integrate the RBV and SGR, anecdotal
evidence suggests this pairing is warranted. In particular, the following example
illustrates how both shared group and unique firm factors play a role in determining firm
performance. The worldwide auto industry has traditionally been explained in terms of
individual firm differences within larger groups. The “big three” US automakers are
commonly referred to as a group in the business press (e.g., Hughes, 1997; Taylor, 1997).
Compared to foreign automakers, US manufacturers make strategically similar decisions
in many areas such as the number and types o f suppliers, length o f contracts, supplier
selection criteria, pricing practices, as well as quality (Cusumano & Takeishi, 1991).
These group differences have definite implications for firm performance. For example,
because Japanese automakers have chosen to invest in more specialized assets than their
American counterparts, they have excelled over the big three in terms o f both quality and
profitability (Dyer, 1996). Despite commonalties among the big three, firms within that
group can be easily distinguished by their uniqueness. The distinctive competence at
Chrysler has been engineering (Breer, 1995). Ford has traditionally focused on
operations (production line) and cost. GM has traditionally outperformed both Chrysler
and Ford due to benefits from their superior economies o f scale (Porter, 1980). Thus,
differences in firm resources have served to differentiate automakers and their reputations
over time (Rao, 1994).

13
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In sum, despite the paucity o f extant theoretical integration, there is evidence to
suggest that both shared group characteristics as well as unique firm resource differences
have the ability to lead to superior performance. Indeed, some researchers have
concluded that significant differences in firm performance can be profiled by examining
differences within strategic groups (Cool & Schendel, 1988; Lawless, Bergh, & Wilsted,
1989; Reger & Huff, 1993). Through strategic choices, managers have discretion to
decide along which dimensions they will be similar to the group and which they will be
different. Next, I make propositions about how firm resources, strategic group
characteristics, or both may lead to enhanced performance.
Achieving Superior Performance: Coupling the Two Views
The RBV and SGR both argue that competitive barriers are used to make strategy
duplication more difficult. Examination o f these two independent research streams
reveals that many researchers have unwittingly acted as though the same resources that
are valuable for firms are also valuable for groups. Indeed, empirical investigations of
the RBV and SGR have operationalized the same constructs when attempting to predict
performance differences (Table 1). For example, both Balikrishnan and Fox (1993) and
Fiegenbaum and Thomas (1990) consider a firm’s financial leverage to be a critical
Table 1. Examples of Measures Used to Define Resource-based and Strategic Group
Uniqueness______________________________________________________________
Measure
Current ratio
Forecasted growth
Size
Leverage
R&D intensity
Capital intensity

Resource-based study
Schoenecker& Cooper, 1998
Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993
Hansen & Wemerfelt, 1989
Balikrishnan & Fox, 1993
Mauri & Michaels, 1998
Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a

Strategic group study
Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, & Thomas, 1990
Dess & Davis, 1984
Porter, 1979
Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990
Hergert, 1987
Hatten & Schendel, 1977
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characteristic influencing performance. Depending on philosophical slant, researchers
have argued that either firm or group is the appropriate level o f analysis or aggregation.
Because previous research has been grounded in one perspective, researchers have not
examined how both firm and group characteristics may affect firm performance.
In the following sections, I elaborate on a number o f situations when firm
resources, group influences, or both may shape a firm’s actions and performance.
Providing a thorough pairing o f resource-based and strategic group influences on firm
performance requires a framework that broadly spans the field of strategic management.
I rely on one provided by Summer and his colleagues (Summer et al., 1990). Their
conceptual framework circumscribes the field of business policy and strategy by
including four main components: strategy, leadership and organization, environment, and
performance (Figure I). Although no universally accepted framework can address every
aspect o f the field, this scheme was developed by a number o f leading scholars in
strategic management and reflects early influential developments by Coase (1937),
Mason (1939), Bain (1956, 1968), and Learned, Christensen, Andrews, and Guth (1965).
This framework is used in the following sections to make propositions about how firm
resources and strategic group characteristics influence and are affected by strategy,
leadership and organization, and the environment. Notably, these influences have
implications for firm performance.
Strategy
A firm’s strategy reflects choices about the range o f businesses the firm operates
in and the competitive approach used by these businesses (Porter, 1980; Summer et al.,
1990). Decisions about how the firm chooses to differentiate in a market are reflected in
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a firm’s business strategy. The RBV and SGR have tended to focus on different aspects
o f business level strategy. SGR has been interested in business level strategies that are
common or generic across firms (Dess & Davis, 1984; Porter, 1979, 1980). In empirical
investigations, strategic groups researchers have generally focused on commonalties in
strategically relevant variables that are important for predicting firm performance in
specific industries. Unfortunately, SGR has generally been criticized for lacking a strong

Strategy

Leadership and
Organization

Performance

Environment

Figure 1: Influences on firm performance in the field o f business policy and
strategy. Adapted from Summer et al., 1990.
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theoretical foundation and little commonality exists in terms o f characteristics that may
be relevant across industries (McGee & Thomas, 1986; Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988).
Perhaps general knowledge about groups has been limited because few studies have
proceeded with an a priori basis for defining unique groups of firms within an industry
(Ketchen, Thomas, & Snow, 1993). Instead, the majority of studies have inductively
defined groups based on patterns that emerge from analytical techniques and “assumed”
these clusters represent a coherent set o f actions and resource commitments that are
shared by group members (Ketchen et al., 1993). While a few studies have progressed by
defining groups based on theoretical typologies such as Porter’s generic strategies (e.g.,
Dess & Davis, 1984) or Miles and Snow’s (1978) prospectors, analyzers, ar.d defenders
(e.g., Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993), these studies have been the exception rather
than the rule.
The RBV is primarily interested in how firm strategies are idiosyncratic for
individual firms in an industry (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Peteraf, 1993;
Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). Although researchers in this scheme do not deny that
commonalties might exist across groups o f firms, their interests lie in understanding
business level strategy as a quest for differentiation through unique resource
accumulation. Consequently, the RBV allows for fine-grained insights about a firm’s
strategy relative to its competitors (Foss, 1996). The differences that yield superior
performance are determined by the distinct abilities o f a firm and its management to
accumulate and implement strategic resources (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998;
Peteraf, 1993; Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). Thus, while generic strategies may be used
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to label a firm’s basic strategic focus, these broad generalizations are not useful for
understanding differences that lead to a sustained competitive advantage.
A small group o f scholars (e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1988; Lawless et al., 1989;
Reger & Huff, 1993) has begun to look for differences inside o f strategic groups that may
lead to performance. These researchers argue that differences within, as well as among
strategic groups may be critical for superior performance. The idea that certain resources
are more critical in some strategic groups than in others is consistent with Porter’s (1980)
view that firm’s will be positioned within their strategic groups based on “structural”
differences. Thus, both strategic group membership as well as a firm’s specific resource
endowments have the ability to influence firm performance. If this is truly the case, it
seems as if an important question of interest to researchers in both views has been long
overlooked. Namely, what level of analysis - firm, strategic group or both is responsible
for influencing firm performance?
Investigations about which level of analysis has the strongest effects on firm
performance represent an important dialogue in strategic management research. Indeed,
a strong history in the strategy literature has tested the disparate influences o f firm and
industry effects to determine which level of analysis is more important for understanding
firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush, Bromiley, & Hendrickx, 1999; Mauri
& Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert, Phillips, &
Westfall, 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). This lively debate is apropos in a
field whose distinctive approach is to examine performance influences from multiple
levels o f analysis (Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). Given the wealth o f conceptual
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evidence that firm’s unique resources as well as strategic group membership have distinct
performance implications, I propose the following,
Proposition 1: Both strategic group membership and a firm’s resource bundle explain a
unique component o f firm performance variance.
The limited research that has examined both firm uniqueness and similarity to the
group has tended to frame uniqueness or similarity in black and white terms, where a firm
is either labeled as representative or deviant from the group’s basic defining traits.
Specifically, Reger and Huff (1993) make a distinction between “core” firms that closely
follow the strategic group recipe, and “secondary” firms that follow the recipe more
loosely. Similarity or uniqueness, however, might be better understood in terms o f
shades of gray where a firm may be representative o f the group on one characteristic but
deviant in another.
Understanding similarity or uniqueness may be furthered by more concise
definition of the strategic group construct. Within a given industry, it is likely that
groups o f firms may be similar on several characteristics. Only some dimensions,
however, will be strategically relevant at the group level. Researchers have provided
several suggestions for improving group definition. Some have argued that strategic
group definition should be based on a priori, deductively defined theoretical frameworks
(Dess & Davis, 1984; Ketchen et al., 1993). Others have argued that the link between
group membership and firm performance be made by measuring unquestionably group
traits such as group bargaining ability with customers or suppliers (Dranove et al., 1998).
Improving understanding o f how group membership influences performance
allows for incorporation o f resource-based explanations. I agree with others who argue
that group membership should be based on similar actions stemming from group
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processes (Dranove et al., 1998). Within a group, though, differences may exist based on
the unique accumulation o f resources among firms.
Explanation o f exactly how strategic group membership might influence resource
influences on performance has been absent from both literatures. I take the position that
characteristics o f strategic group membership moderates the relationship between firm
resources and performance. That is, the ability o f resources to enhance firm performance
is dependent on the core characteristics o f a strategic group.
The following example illustrates how both strategic group and resource-based
explanations can improve understanding o f firm performance. Consider a firm in the
pharmaceutical industry. For some firms in this industry, a capability in research and
development is necessary if the firm shares membership in a group where high R&D
spending is a core characteristic that defines the group (i.e., it is a mobility barrier).
However, for the firm to achieve differentiation on innovation, it will have to spend more
on R&D than other group members. For example, one relevant characteristic that defines
competition in the pharmaceutical industry is the extent that companies focus on brand
name versus generic drugs. Firms focusing on brand name drugs are likely to be in
strategic groups marked by high mobility barriers in R&D spending in comparison to
firms focusing on the efficient manufacturing of generic drugs. In the case where R&D
expenditures are not a core characteristic o f the group, a firm can spend less to
differentiate itself on R&D within the group. Stated formally,
Proposition 2: Strategic group characteristics moderate the relationship between firm
resources and performance.
Researchers o f the RBV and SGR have made few prescriptions concerning the
value that might accrue from holding resources that are similar or unique to other
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members in a given strategic group. A starting point for this question may be gained by
heeding Porter’s (1980) warning that firms not pursuing a clear course o f action and
selecting a viable strategy run the risk of becoming stuck in the middle and experiencing
poor performance. However, whether a firm becomes “stuck in the middle” or not is
likely to depend on both the firm’s resource bundles in relation to others in their group.
Firms must hold and deploy at least the group average o f key resources in order to yield
group average performance. To achieve performance above the group average, firms
must have additional resources beyond those required for group membership. Additional
resources enable the firm to differentiate itself from others in the group, allowing for
enhanced performance.
Proposition 3: Resource accumulation above the group average positively affects firm
performance.
Leadership and Organization
Skilled top management can be a key resource in obtaining sustained competitive
advantage for the firm (Castanias & Helfat, 1991). One critical task o f strategic leaders is
setting aspiration levels, or goals, that guide the firm’s resource commitments (Barnard,
1938; Cyert & March, 1963). These aspirations will in part be determined by the firm’s
conceptualization o f its uniqueness. In this section, I juxtapose the RBV and SGR to
make propositions concerning how these perspectives in tandem might explain key
aspects of organizational identities and aspirations.
Identity. Strategic leadership plays a prominent role in shaping organizational
identity (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Fiol, 1991). Organizational
identity consists o f the collective beliefs about the organization that are distinctive,
central, and enduring (Albert & Whetten, 1985). Identity content acts as a perceptual
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lens, influencing organizational issue interpretations and responses (Dutton & Dukerich,
1991). Because one o f the central functions o f top executives is developing a vision and
sharing that vision with employees (Barnard, 1938; Senge, 1990), top managers are in a
unique position to develop the organizational identities o f their firms. This is an
important task because an organization’s identity can serve as a unique resource leading
to sustainable competitive advantage for firms (Fiol, 1991).
Managers may perceive their firms to have highly unique firm identities (Brown,
1997; Dutton & Dukerich, 1991; Dutton, Dukerich, & Harquail, 1994; Fiol, 1991),
suggesting that they may find little value from group labels imposed by others. Other
firms, however, hold strong identities as members of a strategic group and adopt a group
identity (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Similar to organizational identity, Peteraf and
Shanley (1997: 166) define a strategic group identity as “a set o f mutual understandings,
among members o f a cognitive intraindustry group, regarding the central, enduring, and
distinctive characteristics o f the group.” They argue that strategic group identity will be
strong when groups o f firms perform similarly, are geographically close, and share
network and resource similarities.
Individual firms may have both group identities as well as identities surrounding
their uniqueness. Albert and Whetten (1985) illustrated the concept of dual identity by
describing how the modem research university has a normative identity associated with
the accumulation o f knowledge as well as a utilitarian identity concerned with
productivity and economic rationality. Important performance implications are
associated with the strength o f each identity because identity influences organizational
actions. Within a strategic group, some firms will consistently follow the group recipe,
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closely following similar resource holdings and making similar actions with other “core”
group members (Reger & Huff, 1993). Other firms, however, will act more as
“secondary” group members, following the group strategy less consistently. Firms
holding a strong group identity will likely follow the core strategy o f the group, while
firms without strong groups identities are more likely to act as secondary group members.
Thus,
Proposition 4: Core strategic group members have stronger group identities than
secondary group members.
The interpretations that arise from holding an appropriately strong firm or group
identity have important implications for firm performance. Because stable environments
do not necessitate frequent interpretations (Dutton, 1993; Louis & Sutton, 1991), a strong
strategic group identity will likely lead to superior performance as long as the identity
encourages a firm to accumulate resources similar to other members in a high performing
strategic group. In such environments, consistent firm actions may lead to reliable
profits. In contrast, turbulent environments require frequent adjustments (Thomas, 1996).
Holding to a strong group identity may lead to erroneous interpretations as industry
conditions change the competitive landscape (Reger & Palmer, 1996). In turbulent
environments, historical trends and group dynamics are no longer o f value (D’Aveni,
1994). These considerations suggest the following propositions.
Proposition 5: In stable environments, firm performance will be high when both firm and
group identity are strong.
Proposition 6: In turbulent environments, firm performance will be high when firm
identity, but not group identity, is strong.
Aspirations. Manager’s mental models are resources that can be a source o f
sustained competitive advantage for some firms due to superior creativity, intelligence,
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and strategic planning (Ginsberg, 1994; Senge, 1990). These intellectual resources play a
part in developing aspirations because they affect management’s propensity to focus on
certain aspects o f the firm over others (Ocasio, 1997). While most o f the work on
aspirations has been conducted on individual managers and firms, the strategic group
literature has the potential to extend our knowledge about how aspirations and goals
affect performance.
Strategic groups researchers have suggested that perceived membership has
important implications for firm performance because group membership acts as a
sensemaking mechanism (Reger & Huff, 1993; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Porter, 1980).
This notion is supported by social psychologists who have long argued that individuals
have a natural tendency to compare themselves to others they perceive to be similar (e.g.,
Festinger, 1954). As organizational sensemakers, managers may use understandings
based on a group of firms to navigate their competitive environments (Reger & Palmer,
1996; Porter, 1980). Hence, managers with a strong strategic group identity may use
group performance as an aspiration level to guide their firm’s actions (Fiegenbaum &
Thomas, 1990).
The influence o f group association on the sensemaking process has several
implications for a firm’s strategic actions and resultant performance. Strategic
reorientation can only occur when a discrepancy exists between manager’s aspirations
and past performance (Lant, Milliken, & Batra, 1992; Milliken & Lant, 1991). A strong
strategic group identity may decrease a firm’s search for new ideas if group processes,
interpretations, and actions become habituated within the group. If this is the case, strong
strategic group identity may lead firms to justify poor performance if they associate poor
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performance as a group phenomenon. Indeed, empirical evidence supports the notion
that firms will justify poor performance when it is experienced by other firms they
perceive to be salient comparators (Barr, Stimpert, & Huff, 1992). In this case, an
individual firm’s aspirations may be lowered by strong group identity.
Strategic group identity may in some cases increase aspirations. If performance is
below expectations, a firm will experience an attainment discrepancy that will trigger a
problemistic search (Cyert & March, 1963). If this is the case, they may alter their
resources to improve performance. Aspiration levels may increase if a firm holds a
strong identity as a member o f a high performing group. As the firm raises their
aspirations to match the performance of others in the groups, the firm will also
necessarily alter resources to follow the group strategy. These actions have the potential
to increase firm performance. Stated formally,
Proposition 7: Strategic group identity strength influences aspirations.
Environment
When attempting to understand the determinants of firm performance, research in
strategic management has been built on the assumption that environmental influences
play a significant role in performance achievement and sustainability (Child, 1972; Dess,
Ireland, & Hitt, 1990; Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Meyer, 1991; Porter, 1980; Summer et
al., 1990). In the field o f strategic management, the industry environment has
undoubtedly been the most investigated environmental aspect (Wiersema & Bantel,
1993). Economists have long theorized that industry differences influence organizational
performance (e.g., Bain, 1956), and strategists have identified multiple dimensions that
differentiate industries (cf. Dess & Beard, 1984; Porter, 1980).
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While numerous environmental aspects can be identified, Dess and Beard (1984)
argue that three critical aspects capture the essence of the industry environment:
munificence, dynamism, and complexity. These characteristics have been widely used in
empirical operationalizations o f the environment (e.g., Dess et al., 1990; Keats & Hitt,
1988; Lawless & Finch, 1989; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Sharfman & Dean, 1991;
Weinzimmer, Nystrom, & Freeman, 1998). Thus, I make propositions based on each of
these industry dimensions.
Munificence. Munificence is the extent to which environmental resources are
available and accessible to firms (Aldrich, 1979; Starbuck, 1976). While munificence
should be positively related to performance for all firms in an industry (Porter, 1980;
Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), degree o f industry munificence may favor some strategic
groups over others (Ketchen et al., 1993). Munificence will enable groups of firms with
certain strategic characteristics to benefit over other groups because o f the role resource
accumulation plays in their strategy. For example, firms that operate in a broad domain
will likely benefit from the abundance of resources present in a growing industry
(Carroll, 1984). In contrast, low environmental munificence should favor firms in
strategic groups favoring a more specialized strategic focus (Ketchen et al., 1993). Lack
o f munificence generates limited organizational slack (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993), thus
firms postured to accumulate specific resources are more adept to navigate through
environments characterized by low growth. Thus, industry munificence moderates the
effect o f strategic group characteristics on firm performance. Stated formally,
Proposition 8: Industry munificence moderates the relationship between strategic group
characteristics and firm performance.
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Dynamism. Dynamism refers to environmental changes that are difficult to
predict in terms o f both frequency and direction. Because dynamic environments expose
decision makers to considerable uncertainty (Dess & Beard, 1984; Jurkovich, 1974),
average firm performance suffers (Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Individual firms,
however, can increase performance when they are positioned in strategic groups that are
relatively buffered from the uncertainty. Indeed, Ketchen and colleagues (1993) found
that strategic groups that were positioned to quickly adjust product offerings in response
to changing demand characteristics outperformed groups that lacked this capability.
Environmental dynamism may also have important implications for a firm’s
resource decisions within a group. Dynamism has been found to moderate the
relationship between insider ownership and firm performance (Li & Simerly, 1998),
strategy consensus and firm performance (Homburg, Krohmer, & Workman, 1999), and
rational decision making and firm performance (Priem, Rasheed, & Kotulic, 1995). Thus
considerable evidence exists suggesting dynamism will affect several aspects associated
with managerial habits and abilities, which are critical resources in dynamic
environments. Other resources will also be affected by industry dynamism. For
example, in Miller and Shamsie’s (1996) study of Hollywood film studios they found that
different resources led to financial performance in the stable, predictable environment of
1936-1950 than in the more uncertain environment o f 1951-1965. In a dynamic market,
performance will be enhanced when a firm can quickly gather resources necessary to
achieve competitive advantage by reducing uncertainty. In sum, both group
characteristics as well as firm capabilities both have the ability to lead to superior
performance in dynamic environments. Stated formally,
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Proposition 9a: In dynamic environments, high performance is a function o f a firm’s
ability to quickly access valuable, rare, inimitable, and unsubstitutable resources based on
a firm’s unique capabilities
Proposition 9b: In dynamic environments, high performance is a function o f a firm’s
ability to quickly access valuable, rare, inimitable, and unsubstitutable resources based on
capabilities derived from strategic group membership.
Proposition 9c: The degree o f environmental dynamism will moderate the importance of
a firm’s unique resources on performance.
Complexity. Complexity is characterized by the number and diversity of
competitors, suppliers, buyers, and other environmental actors that firm decision makers
need to consider when formulating strategy (Bourgeois, 1980; Dess & Beard, 1984). As
environmental complexity increases, so does industry rivalry and competition. The idea
that industry competition shapes firms’ strategies and capabilities is well documented in
the literature o f economics as well as both the ecological and strategy traditions. Despite
adequate conceptual grounding, few scholars have linked competitive influences to the
actions of firms and groups (Henderson & Mitchell, 1997).
Perhaps the lack o f interface between firms, groups, and environments is a
function of the strategy field’s strong reliance on economic theory. Traditional economic
thought has generally focused on one aspect of the competitive environment — industry
concentration — and asserted that on average, firm performance is higher in highly
concentrated industries (e.g., Bain, 1956, 1959; Caves, 1972; Koch, 1974; Mann, 1966).
The basic logic underlying this argument does not deny that resource differences may
differentiate competitors in consolidated industries, but rather asserts that firms in
concentrated industries have little incentive to engage in competitive actions because
mutual interdependence encourages higher prices and profits for all industry incumbents
(Porter, 1980).
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Degree o f industry complexity plays an important role in determining how a
firm’s unique resource bundles as well as strategic group characteristics play a role in
determining firm performance. Complex environments involve considerable variety in
the number and diversity o f strategic groups within an industry (Miles, Snow, &
Sharman, 1993). Thus, considerable differences should exist in the mobility barriers and
other characteristics that differentiate strategic groups and their members. In industries
marked by high industry complexity, strategic group membership will likely have
important implications for firm performance because there is great diversity in mobility
barriers leading some groups to outperform others. In less complex industries, however,
mobility barriers are generally high for all industry incumbents (Porter, 1980). In these
industries, which tend to be more consolidated, all of the firms that exist in the industry
must be able to overcome high mobility barriers. Firms in less complex industries are
likely to be at the later stages o f the industry life cycle (Porter, 1980), suggesting that
they show less strategic variety (Miles et al., 1993). Thus, it is likely that a firm’s unique
resources rather than characteristics o f the strategic group will play a more important role
in determining firm performance.
Proposition 10: As industry complexity increases, a firm’s unique resources will play
more o f a role in determining firm performance than strategic group characteristics.
Future Research Implications and Conclusions
I have made the argument that efforts to achieve superior performance will be
aided by considering both firm resources and strategic group influences. Both
practitioners as well as researchers stand to gain from integrating and acknowledging that
both unique firm characteristics and group influences play a critical role in resource
accumulations, allocations, and ultimately outcomes. In the following sections I outline
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implications for practitioners and also make suggestions for combining elements from the
RBV and SGR in future theoretical treatise as well as empirical tests.
Implications for Organizational Decision Makers
To achieve above average performance in today’s hypercompetitive environment,
managers must analyze and understand complex relationships surrounding their resources
as well as the resource bundles o f their competitors. A rich history in strategic
management has aided in helping managers produce a fit between their firm’s unique
strengths and weaknesses and the opportunities and threats that exist in the environment.
A combined knowledge o f a firm’s unique resources as well as any advantage of strategic
group membership is necessary to fully understand firm positioning in the environment.
Although every firm is ultimately unique, recognition o f similar acting groups o f firms
can be invaluable when conducting competitive analysis (Porter, 1980).
To achieve superior performance managers must constantly reanalyze when
unique firm resources or shared strategic group characteristics are more critical to
achieving superior performance. As I have argued, in many cases both will be critical for
long term competitive advantage. For example, in the late 1980s the US semiconductor
industry was dramatically losing market share to foreign competitors. To ameliorate this
trend, a group o f firms in this industry pooled resources to effectively mount an attack
against global competitors (Browning, Beyer, & Shetler, 1995). This cooperation acted
as a source o f competitive advantage for the firms in this group. Unique firm
characteristics, however, continued to be critical. While maintaining the benefits o f this
group effort, Intel gained additional competitive advantage by differentiating their firm
on branding and marketing, as well as quality (D ’Aveni, 1994). As Intel’s experience
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suggests, managers should carefully examine when unique firm resources, strategic group
characteristics, or both can lead to competitive advantage.
Managers must also incorporate firm resources and strategic group characteristics
when developing their corporate level strategy. Indeed, a considerable amount of
research has already adopted a RBV o f corporate strategy (e.g., Markides & Williamson,
1994, 1996; Montgommery & Wemerfelt, 1988; Peteraf, 1993). The RBV provides
insights into effective corporate level strategy by suggesting that managers pursuing
related diversification may encounter enhanced performance when their diversification
efforts allow a business to obtain valuable, rare, imperfectly tradable and costly to imitate
resources (Markides & Williamson, 1996). Little guidance, however, has been given on
how strategic groups might influence corporate strategy because the strategic group
concept has been focused largely on business level strategy. Consequently, few studies
have examined diversified firms. Anecdotal evidence, however, suggests an increasing
role played by strategic groups on corporate strategy. For example, AT&T’s highly
touted acquisition into the cable television market has encouraged other
telecommunications firms to diversify into this industry. Hence, when considering a
strategic acquisition, managers should be aware of any strategic group characteristics that
may enhance or detract from the attractiveness o f their potential acquisitions. Clearly,
managers diversification decisions will be improved when they consider both unique firm
and group influences that will allow them to posture their firm to achieve competitive
advantage and superior performance.
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Implications for Theory Building
Integration o f the RBV and SGR should prove fruitful, especially for building
theory surrounding corporate level strategy. For example, diversification has
considerable implications for corporate performance and remains one o f the central topics
o f interest in strategic management research (Hitt, Gimeno, & Hoskisson, 1998).
Researchers attempting to incorporate information integrating firm resources and
strategic group characteristics into corporate level strategy formulations might begin by
drawing on research in strategic networks. Network researchers have begun to integrate
the RBV into their conceptual frameworks by arguing that managers can create value for
their firms by integrating their resources in network relationships with other suppliers,
customers, or distributors that enable value to be added to their firm (Gulati, 1999;
Stabell & Fjeldstad, 1998). The effect of bargaining power o f groups o f firms in strategic
networks may also play a substantial role in improving firm performance.
Managers create networks by engaging in strategic alliances or acquisitions.
Inasmuch as corporations follow similar acquisition strategies to achieve superior
network structures, strategic groups within a given industry may also become a factor.
As a number o f corporations engage in multipoint competition by diversifying into the
same markets following the same strategy, the content o f strategic groups in an industry
may be altered. Important performance implications can be drawn from such actions.
Corporations that diversify by acquiring a firm in an attractive strategic group will likely
improve their performance. On the contrary, corporations that acquire a firm in an
unattractive strategic group may watch their corporation’s performance erode.
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Manager’s diversification decisions are driven by their ideas of relatedness
(Prahalad & Bettis, 1986), which can be conceptualized in many ways (Stimpert &
Duhaime, 1997b). Future theoretical research should investigate how unique firm
resources and strategic group membership affect manager’s cognitions and thus influence
corporate diversification decisions. For example, holding a strong unique firm identity
may discourage some corporations from making acquisitions in some strategic groups
because they would consider these acquisitions to be inconsistent with their
conceptualizations o f relatedness. As well, managers o f firms with low levels o f
diversification may be tempted to make acquisitions of firms that operate in strategic
groups similar to their dominate business. In contrast, managers o f highly diversified
firms will probably not be biased in this fashion.
The pairing o f the RBV and SGR offers many additional opportunities for
theoretical integration. For example, how do individual firm resource choices affect the
structure o f the strategic group over time? When is it advisable for an individual firm to
enter or leave a group? Can individual firms achieve a sustainable competitive advantage
by creating unique isolating mechanisms at one point in time, and collaborating to form
group entry barriers at other time points? Many fruitful investigations considering both
firm resources and strategic group characteristics remain.
Implications for Theory Testing
Our knowledge o f firm resource and strategic group influences on performance
can be furthered by rigorous empirical tests incorporating elements from both o f these
views. The differing theoretical bases underlying the RBV and SGR have historically
lead to distinct research strategies. Because the RBV assumes heterogeneity in resources
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and performance, studies o f this view have logically relied on regression analysis in
empirical investigations (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). In contrast, SGR generally
has assumed homogeneity among group members and explored systematic differences in
group performance. Under this view, empirical investigation has used a variety o f
methods to cluster firms into groups (Ketchen & Shook, 1996), and then examine group
differences (i.e., main effects o f group characteristics on performance) using
ANOVA/MANOVA techniques (e.g., Cool & Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum & Thomas,
1990, 1995; Lewis & Thomas, 1990). In this section, I provide guidance for researchers
with the hope that they will include elements from both the RBV as well as SGR into
future empirical tests.
Essentially, a level o f analysis debate has hindered empirical integration o f these
two views. The RBV argues that firms are the appropriate unit o f analysis, while
strategic groups researchers propose group level investigation is warranted. If both views
have merit, then previous research has made a number o f theoretical and methodological
errors. For example, if groups have an influence on individual performance, studies
conducted solely at the individual level o f analysis have violated the independence o f
observations assumption that underlies traditional statistical approaches (Bryk &
Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997). If individuals have an influence on performance,
studies examining only group influences on performance have discarded potentially
meaningful lower level variance (Hofmann, 1997). If both influence firm performance,
researchers have failed to investigate substantive research questions such as which level
accounts for more variance in firm performance.
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It is notable that this level o f analysis debate is familiar to other disciplines that
engage in organizational research. In the organizational behavior literature, studies o f
work group applications have similarly endeavored to understand which level of analysis
(i.e., individual or group) more strongly influences individual performance (Hofmann,
1997). Across disciplines, educational researchers have faced similar challenges when
determining if child, class, or school is the best level to investigate when attempting to
predict academic performance (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Within our own field, a
lively debate continues to test whether firm or industry accounts for more variance in
firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998;
McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991;
Schmalensee, 1985). The strategic group level of analysis, however, has been ignored in
such studies. Thus, our understanding of how firms, strategic groups, and industries
influence firm performance has been limited.
To empirically test resource-based and strategic group influences on firm
performance, researchers should endeavor to employ techniques that allow testing of
multiple levels o f analysis simultaneously (Dranove et al., 1998; Rouse & Daeilenbach,
1999). Within the last decade, statistical developments from other fields have allowed
for the introduction o f hierarchical linear modeling techniques that are appropriate for
analyzing data at multiple levels o f analysis. These techniques are well documented in
the education literature (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992), and have recently emerged in the
management literature as well (e.g., Hofmann, 1997; Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Kidwell,
Mossholder, & Bennett, 1997). These techniques hold great promise for researchers in
strategic management.
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Several additional issues are worth noting. When combining the two views,
sample selection will likely play a role in substantive research conclusions. Because
research in strategic groups has often studied a single industry with single business
competitors, initial studies combining these two views should rely on rich investigations
o f firm resources and strategic group characteristics in a single industry setting composed
o f single business firms (Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). An ideal setting for initial
investigations would be an industry where there is previous theoretical and empirical
evidence that strategic groups exist. Following formative inquiries concerning firm and
group performance affects, researchers should attempt to establish generalizability by
relying on multiple industry designs.
Another thorny methodological issue that arises when pairing these two views
concerns how to handle diversified firms. While pioneering efforts to understand firm
and group influences would be well advised to control for diversification by sampling
from single business firms, ultimately diversification should be modeled and the efficacy
o f corporate resource bundles on performance can be assessed to understand firm
performance (Markides & Williamson, 1996).
Conclusion
The RBV and SGR have largely ignored each other in relation to many relevant
strategic issues that have important implications for firm performance. A more realistic
picture can be seen when researchers acknowledge and investigate influences that occur
both within and between groups. Both theoretical developments and empirical
investigations stand to gain when insights and ideas stemming from both o f these two
views are acknowledged.
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RESOURCE-BASED AND STRATEGIC GROUP INFLUENCES ON
ORGANIZATIONAL PERFORMANCE IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY
Predicting firm performance continues to top many strategic management scholars
research agendas (March & Sutton, 1997; Meyer, 1991; Summer et al., 1990). To
accomplish this goal, strategy researchers have incorporated insights from numerous
disciplines such as economics, administrative management, psychology, and marketing
(Biggadike, 1981; Jemison, 1981a, 1981b; Porter, 1981). This blending o f multiple
perspectives to answer practical research questions such as the determinants of firm
performance is one o f the key qualities that distinguishes the field from related
disciplines (Meyer, 1991).
Although rich conceptual integration has been encouraged in much strategy
research, two key perspectives in the field — the resource-based view o f the firm and
strategic groups research — have largely ignored each other concerning how firms
achieve superior performance (e.g., Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Reger &
Huff, 1993; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). The resource-based view o f the firm (RBV)
argues that differences in firm resources and capabilities provide the basis for superior
firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989;
Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984). From this perspective, performance is a
function of manager’s ability to acquire and deploy the resources needed to achieve
sustained competitive advantage for their organization. Strategic groups research (SGR)
focuses on sets o f firms within the same industry that follow similar strategies (Cool &
Schendel, 1988; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1995; Hunt, 1972; Porter, 1979,1980; Reger &
Huff, 1993; Thomas & Venkatraman, 1988). Membership in a strategic group can be an
important contextual influence, altering interpretations, actions, and ultimately
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performance (Dranove et al., 1998; Peteraf & Shanley, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993).
Under this view, firms need not be uniquely different in their resources and actions from
all the industry’s incumbents. Rather, similarity may be advantageous for some firms.
If both o f these views have merit, then previous research relying on one
perspective to the exclusion o f the other has both theoretical as well as methodological
limitations. Conceptually, overlooking one view in favor o f the other ignores a
significant line o f research that has been supported in the literature. Methodologically, a
level o f analysis issue also confounds interpretation o f previous empirical research. For
example, if groups have an influence on individual performance, studies conducted solely
at the individual level o f analysis have violated the independence o f observations
assumption that underlies traditional statistical approaches (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992;
Hofmann, 1997). If individual firm resources have an influence on performance, then
studies examining only group influences on performance have discarded potentially
meaningful lower level variance (Hofmann, 1997). Subsequently, some researchers have
argued for a test of the effect o f strategic group characteristics on firm performance that
controls for the effects o f firm resources (Dranove et al., 1998). As well, empirical
investigations o f resource-based and strategic group explanations should use a single
industry to control for industry attributes that affect strategic decisions (Rouse &
Daellenbach, 1999). Such a test would increase the rigor over previous research, and
serve to integrate SGR with the conceptual foundation o f the RBV.
When used in isolation each o f these two perspectives provides an incomplete
picture o f why some firms outperform others. Hence, simultaneous consideration o f the
RBV and SGR has the potential to yield considerable insights about how firms can
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achieve superior performance within their competitive environments (Mahoney &
Pandian, 1992; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). In this paper, I test the influences o f firm
resources and strategic group membership on firm performance in a single model. By
investigating firm resource and strategic group influences on firm performance
simultaneously, this paper works towards integration o f these two perspectives’ disparate
insights.
Literature Review
Although the RBV and SGR approaches to achieving superior performance are
both based in part by research within economics, they differ considerably in terms o f the
managerial actions taken to enhance organizational performance. In the following
sections I briefly review the literature on both of these views, focusing on their separate
insights for achieving superior firm performance.
Review of the Resource Based Perspective
The central tenet o f the RBV is that firm profitability is a function o f an
organization’s unique resource bundles (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991;
Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984). Resources are
broadly defined to encompass specific assets as well as human competencies and
intangible abilities (Barney, 1991; Peteraf, 1993). Under the RBV, the performance of an
individual firm is a function o f managers’ rational attempts to enhance efficiency,
effectiveness, and performance by accumulating and deploying scarce resources (Conner,
1991; Oliver, 1997). Ideally, managers will strive to accumulate resources that are
valuable, rare, without substitutes, and bundled in a manner so that the firm’s resources,
and thus strategies, are inimitable by current and future competitors (Barney, 1991).
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Attaining such resources involves overcoming significant acquisition barriers (Amit &
Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1986; Penrose, 1959). Thus, managers who are able to
overcome these barriers place their organizations in a desirable competitive position.
The RBV has emerged as a central perspective in strategic management,
providing a common thread in a field that has historically lacked a distinct paradigm
(Conner, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Peteraf, 1993; Wemerfelt, 1995). The RBV
has aided improved understanding of diversification (Markides & Williamson, 1996),
human resource systems (Lado & Wilson, 1994), organizational culture (Barney, 1986a;
Fiol, 1991), strategic networks (Gulati, 1999), strategic regulation (Maijoor & Van
Witteloostuijn, 1996) in addition to firm performance (Amit & Schoemaker, 1993;
Barney, 1991; Dierickx & Cool, 1989; Grant, 1991; Peteraf, 1993).
Although the RBV has become a cornerstone for building understandings about
competitive advantage in the field o f strategic management (Peteraf, 1993), the basis for
this perspective is by no means novel. Economists have long relied on a similar concept
of Ricardian rents that can be generated from ownership of valuable land, labor, capital,
and entrepreneurial abilities (Ricardo, 1817). The RBV is also similar to SWOT analysis
in which strategy formulation progresses by analyzing the “fit” between a firm’s
positioning o f its internal strengths and weaknesses with the environment’s external
opportunities and threats (Andrews, 1971; Ansoff, 1965; Porter, 1980). Originating at the
Harvard Business School, this ‘design’ school of thought is based on the premise that
firms are idiosyncratic (Mintzberg, 1990). Hence, understanding the determinants o f firm
performance can best be accomplished by analysis that focuses on a firm’s unique
resources and capabilities.
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In sum, the RBV assumes firm performance is a function o f holding and
deploying unique resources. Desiring to equip their firms with scarce resources that will
lead to superior performance, managerial choices drive the resource accumulation
process. This view is well documented in the strategic management literature, and draws
from classic economic thought as well. Although the RBV reflects a rich industrial
organization economics heritage, this theory is distinct from other economic views
because it is relevant at the firm, not industry, level of analysis and because the RBV
argues that firm resource combinations can result in persistent above-average
performance (Conner, 1991).
Review o f Strategic Groups Research
The concept of the strategic group first originated with Hunt (1972), who
observed distinct sets o f firms in the major home appliance industry. Although Hunt
focused primarily on the structure within industries, Newman (1973) provided evidence
that differences in behavior across groups led to performance differences among groups.
The most compelling conceptual foundation for the strategic groups - performance link
was laid by the work o f Porter (Caves & Porter, 1977; Porter, 1979, 1980), who argued
that differences among groups in factors such as marketing methods, technologies, and
capital requirements resulted in “mobility barriers” that insulated group members from
potential group entrants.
Empirical work on strategic groups began to blossom in the late 1970s and
continues to flourish. Despite considerable grounding conceptually as well as
empirically, though, the evidence that group membership influences firm performance
has been equivocal to date. While the link between group membership and performance
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has been supported in numerous empirical studies (e.g., Dess & Davis, 1984; Fiegenbaum
& Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996; Nath & Gruca, 1997; Reger & Huff, 1993), others fail to
establish such a link (e.g., Barney & Hoskisson, 1990; Cool & Schendel, 1988).
Differences in individual study outcomes may be attributable to numerous factors such as
how variables used to define strategic direction are operationalized (McGee & Thomas,
1986), how strategic group membership is conceptualized (Ketchen et al., 1993), and how
researchers “cluster” firms into groups empirically (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). Across
studies, though, a meta-analytic review of the literature found that 8% of the variance in
firm performance can be attributed to group membership (Ketchen et al., 1997).
Managerial actions are critical in determining firm performance within a group.
Because firms within a group are mutually interdependent, managers within a group are
more able to anticipate, monitor, and react to fellow group member’s actions more
accurately and quickly than non-group members (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Mutual
understandings among group members about the central, enduring characteristics o f the
group constitute a strategic group identity that has the potential to lead to both positive
and negative firm level outcomes (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Thus, both cognitive
understandings as well as objective structural differences play a role in linking group
membership to performance.
Relating the Resource-based View and Strategic Groups Research
The RBV and SGR have emerged as two o f the most investigated conceptual
frameworks for analyzing firm performance differences in the strategy literature. Despite
continuing interest in these theories, conceptual integration o f these two views is lacking
(Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). The most marked difference between these views is found
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in their divergent prescriptive implications. The RBV asserts that firms should strive to
position themselves in such a manner so that no other firm can duplicate their unique
resource bundle, while SGR suggests that mutual interdependence among firms may
allow insulation from rivalry because some groups have superior bargaining power with
buyers and suppliers, and face less o f a threat from substitute products in other industries
(Dranove et al., 1998; Porter, 1979). Thus, SGR argues that some determinants o f firm
performance are unique between groups, but similar within.
Pairing these two views can be accomplished by examining how managers’
choices and actions drive the accumulation of idiosyncratic firm resources as well as
decisions about competitive position within a strategic group. While the collective
beliefs o f organizational members about how a firm is unique can play a critical role in
organizational interpretations and actions (Albert & Whetten, 1985; Dutton & Dukerich,
1991), managers also perceive and respond to firms that are similar in strategy (Peteraf &
Shanley, 1997; Porac, Thomas, & Baden-Fuller, 1989; Porter, 1980). Thus, both
individual and group processes may influence interpretations, actions, and outcomes. In
sum, despite the paucity o f extant theoretical integration, there is evidence to suggest that
both shared group characteristics as well as unique firm resource differences have the
ability to lead to superior performance.
Hypotheses
In the following sections, 1 elaborate how firm resources, group influences, or
both may shape manager’s actions and organizational performance. Specifically, I make
hypotheses about how the RBV and SGR may together improve understanding o f the
effects o f strategic actions on organizational performance.
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Contributions of Group Membership and Firm Uniqueness on Performance
A firm’s strategy reflects choices about the range o f businesses the firm operates
in and the competitive approach used by these businesses (Porter, 1980; Summer et al.,
1990). The RBV and SGR have tended to focus on different aspects o f business level
strategy. SGR has been interested in business level strategies that are common or generic
across firms (Dess & Davis, 1984; Porter, 1979, 1980). In empirical investigations, SGR
has focused on commonalties in strategically relevant variables that are important for
predicting firm performance in specific industries.
The RBV is primarily interested in how firm strategies are idiosyncratic for
individual firms in an industry (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Peteraf, 1993;
Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). Although researchers in this scheme do not deny that
commonalties might exist across groups of firms, their interests lie in understanding
business level strategy as a quest for differentiation through unique resource
accumulation. Consequently, the RBV allows for fine-grained insights about a firm’s
strategy relative to competitors (Foss, 1996). The differences that yield superior
performance are determined by the distinct abilities o f a firm and its management to
accumulate and implement strategic resources (Barney, 1991; Mauri & Michaels, 1998;
Peteraf, 1993; Schoenecher & Cooper, 1998). Thus, while generic strategies may be used
to label a firm’s basic strategic focus, these broad generalizations are not useful for
understanding differences that lead to a sustained competitive advantage.
Recent work in SGR has begun to bridge the gap between these two theories by
acknowledging that differences in firm strategies and performance may exist both within
and between strategic groups (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Indeed, Lawless, Bergh, and
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Wilsted (1989) used separate analysis for group and firm influences on performance to
conclude that both group characteristics and firm capabilities influenced firm
performance. Reger and Huff (1993) argued that any given strategic group contains
“core” members who compete by closely following the basic recipe that defines the
strategic group, as well as “secondary” group members who loosely follow the group
recipe (Reger & Huff, 1993). Thus, elements o f both group membership and unique firm
characteristics may influence performance.
If both firm uniqueness as well a group membership influence performance, an
important question o f interest to researchers in both views has been long overlooked.
Namely, what level o f analysis - firm, strategic group, or both, is most responsible for
influencing firm performance? Investigations about level o f analysis effects on firm
performance represent an important dialogue in strategic management research. Indeed,
a strong history in the strategy literature has tested the disparate influences of firm and
industry effects to determine which level o f analysis is more important for understanding
firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998;
McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991;
Schmalensee, 1985). This lively debate is apropos in a field whose distinctive approach
is to examine performance influences spanning multiple levels o f analysis (Meyer, 1991;
Summer et al., 1990).
Decomposing variance into organizational and group levels may further our
understanding or resource-based and strategic group influences on performance. When
examined together, several possibilities exist. For example, it could be that little variance
exists at the group level, setting the value o f strategic groups research as suspect. In
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contrast, the majority o f the variation in performance could be between groups with little
variation within. Such a finding would question the merit o f the resource-based
explanations. Given the wealth o f conceptual evidence that firm’s unique resources as
well as strategic group membership have distinct performance implications, I hypothesize
the following,
Hypothesis 1: Both strategic group membership and a firm’s unique resource bundle
explain a unique component o f firm performance variance.
The Effect o f Group and Organizational Characteristics on Performance
While understanding the extent to which firms or strategic groups explain
variation in firm performance can provide a valuable contribution to the literature, further
insights can be gained by understanding how variables at each level o f analysis influence
performance. O f specific interest is the influence o f strategic group membership on
performance. Strategic groups researchers have implicitly argued for a direct link
between group membership and performance. Group membership in and of itself,
however, is not directly responsible for differentiating groups in terms o f performance.
Instead, it is likely that persistent structural features such as mobility barriers in certain
key areas make group membership more attractive in some groups over others (Caves &
Porter, 1977; Dranove et al., 1998; Mehra, 1996). Other specific group traits might
include group bargaining ability (Dranove et al., 1998), or a strong group reputation or
image (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Thus, the advantage of group membership is a
function o f specific characteristics that exist solely at the group level o f analysis. These
characteristics have been labeled as strategic industry factors, or resources that are
valuable within an industry (as opposed to idiosyncratic resources) (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993; Mehra, 1996). Such characteristics are a distinct function o f group processes and
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actions, beyond any action taken by individual actors within the group. Researchers have
argued that if such group processes truly exists, then their effects should be detected after
controlling for possible resource influences (Dranove et al., 1998). Hence, I propose the
following:
Hypothesis 2: Strategic group characteristics have a direct (i.e., main) effect on firm
performance above and beyond that accounted for by firm resources.
Strategic Group Characteristics Moderate Firm Resources Effects on Performance
Group membership may also have an indirect affect on firm performance by
changing the nature o f the relationship between firm resources and performance within a
group. The idea that certain resources are more critical in some strategic groups than in
others is consistent with Porter’s (1980) view that firm’s will be positioned within their
strategic groups based on “structural” differences. While all firms within a strategic
group may receive some benefit from group membership, resource heterogeneity may
influence within group performance differences (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Indeed, Reger
and Huff (1993) found that firms closely representing the group’s “core” defining traits
outperformed firms following the group recipe less consistently. This notion is backed
by considerable theoretical and empirical evidence stemming from the resource-based
view that differences in firm resources and assets are critical determinants o f firm
performance differences (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx &
Cool, 1989; Lawless et al., 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984).
Despite conceptual and empirical evidence that both firm resources as well as
group characteristics influence firm performance, little guidance has been given about the
form o f the relationship between resources, strategic group membership, and
performance. I take the position that strategic group membership moderates the
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relationship between firm resources and performance. That is, characteristics o f the
group alter the efficacy o f firm resources to enhance performance. For example, firms
overcoming substantial mobility barriers in marketing and R&D to position themselves
into a group will likely find it even more difficult to differentiate their firms from other
group members on these characteristics. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 3: Strategic group characteristics moderate the relationship between firm
resources and performance.
Methods
Sample and Data
A sample was drawn from the U.S. healthcare industry. The use o f the healthcare
industry was attractive for several reasons. First, a single industry is desirable to provide
a rich analysis o f how firm resources and strategic group characteristics influence firm
performance in a well-documented context (cf. Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). Indeed, the
existence o f strategic groups has been well documented in this industry (Ketchen et al.,
1993; Pegels & Sekar, 1989; Shortell, Morrison, & Friedman, 1990; Zajac & Shortell,
1989). Finally, hospitals are critical components of the healthcare industry, a segment of
the U.S. economy that accounts for approximately 15% o f the country’s gross domestic
product (Beekun Stedham, & Young, 1998).
To capture this competitive environment I further constrain my sample to a single
metropolitan area. Sampling from a single geographic region is recommended when
studying the health care industry, because there is evidence that competition within this
industry is geographically based (Chiswick, 1976; Hambrick, 1982; Nath & Sudharshan,
1994). I obtained data from the Center for Health Care Industry Performance Studies,
and from the Guide to the Health Care Field o f the American Hospital Association.
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Data were collected from the years 1988-92 from an entire population o f 86
hospitals in a large metropolitan area in the northeastern United States (excluding
Veterans’ Administration hospitals, military-base hospitals, and university health
centers). The years 1988-1992 were chosen to examine an environment that would be
characterized by heavy competition for resources and diversity in the actions o f
environmental actors. This was the case among hospitals beginning in the late 1980s.
Before 1986, most hospitals were reimbursed the full cost of patient care from third-party
payers. However, after 1986 the Medicare Prospective Payment System was fully
implemented, and hospitals were only reimbursed based on predetermined levels based
on the medical condition treated. Thus, while hospitals once had the ability to generate
profits by discretionary pricing policies, after 1986 hospitals needed to provide their
services below the price limits to be profitable. The decision to use 1988 as the starting
point o f data collection is critical, because this represented the period o f time
immediately following the implementation o f the new Medicare Prospective Payment
System.
To enhance my ability to make causal inferences about multilevel influences on
organizational performance, I used a lagged structure (Beekun et al., 1998; Palmer &
Wiseman, 1999). Resources and strategic group characteristics were taken from the years
1988-1990, and performance measurements were taken from the years 1990-1992. Three
years o f organizational resource and performance data are needed to provide stable
measures o f organizational resources and performance (cf. Beekun et al, 1998; Keats &
Hitt, 1988). One year o f data overlap is chosen because some resources will have
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immediate effects on performance, while other resources may take a number of years
before their performance affects are fully realized (cf. Palmer & Wiseman, 1999).
Firm Resource Measures
A number o f organizational resource categorizations have been presented in the
literature (Black & Boal, 1994). I use the classification o f Chatteijee and Wemerfelt
(1991), which places organizational resources into three categories: physical, intangible,
and financial. This classification is well grounded in the literature (e.g., MacDonald,
1984; Montgommery & Hariharan, 1990; Teece, 1982) and remains a popular resource
classification framework (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). To operationalize
organizational resources, I select two measures from each o f these categories.
Physical resources. Physical resources embody the firm’s physical technology,
plant and equipment, geographic location, and access to raw materials (Barney, 1991). I
use several measures to operationalize this construct. First, 1 use a measure o f capital
investment, or funds spent to improve the firm’s facilities. A firm that makes a consistent
commitment in capital expenditures is continually building their property, plant and
equipment. As well, capital investment is a resource allocation that has been shown to
have a strong relationship with firm performance across studies (e.g., Capon, Farley, &
Hoenig, 1990; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). Finally, capital investment represents an
important strategic decision in the hospital industry (Beekun et al., 1998). To indicate
capital investment I collected data on the total spending on buildings and fixtures
measured in millions o f dollars. In addition, I used an indicator variable to measure if the
hospital was in an urban or suburban location. Location in the hospital industry can be a
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critical resource effecting access to both customers and employees (Nath & Sudharshan,
1994).
Intangible resources. Intangible resources are assets and skills that are generally
a function o f human innovation or entrepreneurial ability (Michalisin, Smith, & Kline,
1997). To measure intangible resources for hospitals, I use the amount of direct medical
education, defined as intern and resident salaries plus other direct costs divided by the
number o f full-time interns and residents (cf. Ketchen et al., 1993). Hospitals that wish
to adopt a new technology must have qualified personnel to ensure that their technology
is used both efficiently and effectively. Hospitals that spend more on direct medical
education are making a commitment towards having a highly trained workforce capable
of utilizing the most up to date technological healthcare equipment (Ketchen et al., 1993).
Also, the amount spent on direct medical education plays an important role in influencing
a hospital’s reputation. Direct medical education expenses are measured in thousands of
dollars. I supplement this measure with organizational age. Unique historical conditions
can be a source o f competitive advantage for firms (Barney, 1991). Hospitals that have
been operating longer have accumulated intangible knowledge and experience gleaned
from many years o f operations into their culture and identity. As well, age has been
identified by others as a factor that influences the type of strategy pursued by health care
organizations (Beekun et al., 1998; Topping & Hernandez, 1991).
Financial resources. Financial resources enhance competitive advantage because
they represent the ability and likelihood of competitive response (Bourgeois, 1981).
Firms with available financial resources may experiment with new product offerings, and
engage in a host o f actions that would otherwise be constrained (Moses, 1992;
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Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). To measure financial resources, I use the current ratio,
defined as current assets divided by current liabilities. I chose this measure because it is
common to studies o f both firm resources (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998) as well as
strategic groups (e.g., Fiegenbaum, Sudharshan, & Thomas, 1990; Lawless et al., 1989).
I complement this measure with the debt to asset ratio, defined as total liabilities divided
by total assets (cf. Nath & Sudharshan, 1994). The debt to asset ratio is an important
financial measure for understanding hospital funding (Nath & Sudharshan, 1994).
Performance. Organizational performance is a construct with innumerable
indicators and definitions; a broad conception of the domain o f performance includes
financial performance, as well as organizational effectiveness (Venkatraman &
Ramanujam, 1986). To provide a rigorous test of the influences o f organizational
resources and strategic group characteristics on hospital performance, I incorporate
indicators from each subset o f organizational performance. To measure financial
performance, 1 follow other studies that have compared firm and contextual influences on
firm performance and use return on assets (ROA)(e.g., Keats & Hitt, 1988; Mauri &
Michaels, 1998; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). Average occupancy is used to
operationalize effectiveness (cf. Nath, 1988; Nath & Sudharshan, 1994), and efficiency is
captured by admissions per bed (Ketchen, Thomas, & McDaniel, 1996).
Strategic Group Measures and Clustering Procedure
The evolution o f configuration analysis has produced two distinct approaches
(Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993). The inductive approach focuses on empirically
derived configurations appropriate for a given context. For example, many strategic
group studies have clustered firms on a variety o f industry specific measures including
manufacturing, marketing, financial, and industry characteristics. Because each industry
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is seen as unique, the inductive approach provides no theoretical reason to expect a
specific number o f strategic groups in any given industry. In contrast, the deductive
approach is a theory driven approach that specifies generic strategies that can be applied
to a wide variety o f industry contexts (Ketchen et al., 1993). Because o f the overarching
interest in comparing theoretical frameworks, I rely on a deductive approach for its
superior generalizability.
While other deductive approaches have been used in the literature (e.g., Dess &
Davis, 1984), the deductive approach used in this study relies on two theoretical
perspectives at the heart o f organizational analysis — strategic choice (Child, 1972;
Miles & Snow, 1978) and organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The basic
premise o f this approach is that a firm’s strategy varies on two independent competitive
dimensions derived from these theories (Zammuto, 1988) (see Figure 2). The first
dimension relates to a firm’s competitive advantage, expressed as the ability to exploit
new opportunities. This may be accomplished by being first to market, or otherwise
exploiting a new market quickly. The second dimension focuses on breadth of
operations. This dimension includes number of distributors, geographic or product scope,
and market growth/ share goals (Bantel, 1998). A strong competence in only one o f these
dimensions is needed for sustained competitive advantage (Zammuto, 1988).
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Breadth o f Domain
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r-specialist
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r-generalist
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Analyzer/
K-generalist

of

Competition
Efficiency

Figure 2. Strategic types combining the organizational ecology and strategic choice
perspectives. Adapted from Zammuto (1988).
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Combining these two dimensions results in four distinct quadrants that closely
parallel the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. The first quadrant is represented by
defenders/ K-specialists, who focus on existing opportunities in a narrow domain. The
second quadrant encompasses entrepreneurs/ r-specialists, who pursue existing
opportunities in a narrow domain. The third quadrant is comprised of Analyzers/ Kgeneralists, who efficiently exploit existing opportunities in a broad domain. Finally,
prospectors/ r-generalists pursue new opportunities in a broad domain.
To implement this deductive approach, I used indicators from each of the two
competitive dimensions: source o f competitive advantage and breadth of operations (cf.
Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993). Competitive advantage in the health care industry
was measured as the average percentage o f routine patient days for each hospital in the
study from the years 1988-1990. This was calculated as the number o f total routine in
patient days divided by the total number of in-patient days (cf. Ketchen, et al., 1993).
Hospitals seeking to exploit new services will have a large percentage o f their patients
relying on nonroutine services such as neonatal and bum care units relative to the
percentage relying on routine services (e.g., radiology, pharmacy) (Ketchen et al., 1993;
Shortell et al., 1990). Hospitals attempting to gain competitive advantage through
nonroutine services tend to emphasize innovation (an r-strategy), whereas those with a
high percentage o f routine service days focus more on efficiency (a K-strategy) (cf.
Ketchen et al., 1993). Breadth o f operations was operationalized as the average number
of services offered by each hospital during 1988-1990. Hospitals that operate with a
narrow breadth o f service offerings follow more o f a specialist strategy, while hospitals
with a broader range follow more o f a generalist strategy (Ketchen et al., 1993).
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A two-stage clustering procedure was used to cluster the firms in the analysis
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992; Ketchen & Shook, 1996). A two-stage process
is valuable because it increases the validity o f cluster solutions (Ketchen & Shook, 1996;
Milligan, 1980; Punj & Stewart, 1983). This procedure first uses hierarchical clustering
to determine the number o f groups and their cluster centroids (i.e., Ward’s method) and
then uses the results as the starting point for a nonhierarchical clustering (i.e., K-means).
Criterion validity was assessed through MANOVA significance tests with the
performance variables used in this study (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). After deriving
groups, the group means for each o f the variables in the cluster analysis were used as
level-2 variables in the hierarchical linear modeling analysis.
Analysis
To test the influences o f firm and strategic group levels of analysis I use a
hierarchical linear modeling technique (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Hierarchical linear
modeling (HLM) allows for the treatment of multiple levels o f analysis on a single
dependent variable. HLM is uniquely suited to strategy research because many questions
in strategic management research involve an inherently nested structure (i.e., firms are
nested within strategic groups; strategic groups are nested within industries, etc.).
Specifically, I used the HLM/2L statistical software program (Bryk et al., 1996) to
measure organizational (i.e., level-1) and strategic group (i.e., level-2) effects on hospital
performance. The technique estimates the amount of variance in organizational
performance that is accounted for by each level o f analysis (i.e., hospital and strategic
group), as well as tests independent variables that may explain variance in performance at
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each level (i.e., specific hospital resources and strategic group characteristics). Appendix
A provides details o f the HLM method and models tested in this study.
Results
Table 2 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations among level-1
(i.e., individual hospital) variables. The cluster analysis results indicate three distinct
groups that are depicted visually in table 3. Group 1 consists o f defenders who rely on a
limited number o f routine services. Group 3 consists o f prospectors who use a high
degree o f nonroutine services while operating in a large operations breadth. Group 2
consists o f hospitals who balance both innovation as well as operations breadth. These
firms do not clearly follow one o f the strategic types proposed by Zammuto (1988). I
label these hospitals as “balancers" in the post hoc analysis that follows. Results o f
MANOVA significance tests using firm performance measures support the validity o f
cluster solutions. The Wilks’ Lamda, provided by the MANOVA shows significant
differences in performance based on group membership (F6.I62 = 10.44; pc.OOl).
The variance decomposition results for each of the performance measures used to
evaluate hypothesis 1 are found in table 4. For financial performance, differences within
strategic groups accounted for 98.2% o f the variance in ROA. In contrast, only 1.8% of
the variation was accounted for by between group differences. This 1.8% of variance
was insignificant (p = .11). For organizational effectiveness, 89.36% of the variation in
average occupancy was accounted for by within group differences while 10.64% o f the
variation was between groups. In terms o f efficiency, 59.83% o f the variation in
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Table 2. Correlations Among Level-1 Independent Variables (Hospital Data)
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
Standard I.
deviation
3.66
1.00
1. Capital Spending
4.24
1.00
.48
2. Urban/ Suburban
.50
.11
.24
1.00
19.54
22.79
.18
3. Direct Med. Exp.
.34
.27
69.41
46.97
.18
1.00
4. Age
-.04
2.07
.07
5. Current Ratio
1.07
-.02
.22
1.00
.67
.00
.25
-.07
-.59
1.00
6. Debt-to-assets
.39
.03
Notes: n = 86; Correlations above .2 are significant at the .05 level; Correlations above .3
are significant at the .01 level.
Mean

Table 3. Cluster Analysis Results (Hopital Data)
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3
3

Table 4. Variance Decomposition - Hospital Data

Level - 1 (Hospital)
Level - 2 (Group)
Total

ROA
Occupancy Admissions/ Bed
98.2%
89.36%
59.83%
1.8%
40.17%
10.64%
100%
100%
100%

admissions per bed was accounted for by within group differences and 40.17% o f the
variation was between groups. For both nonfinancial measures, the amount o f variance at
each level was significant (pc.OOl). Overall, these results paint a mixed picture. Group
membership had no effect on financial performance, but a significant influence on
organizational effectiveness and efficiency, providing mixed evidence for hypothesis 1.
Table 5 displays the results for hypothesis 2 that predicted an influence o f
strategic group characteristics on performance above and beyond that felt by
Table 5. Tests of Group (i.e., main) Effects Controlling for Organizational
Resources (p-values)
ROA
Percentage o f routine patient days (yoi)
1-40
Numbers o f services (702)
I -36
Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital
while group characteristics are uncentered.

Occupancy
.71
.34
resources are

Admissions per bed
.89
.10
grand mean centered

(Coefficients)

Percentage o f routine patient days (yoi)
Numbers of services (702)

ROA
Occupancy
2.89
87
.01
00

Admissions per bed
-276.39
- 1.00

Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital resources are grand mean
centered while group characteristics are uncentered.
organizational resources. The first step in this process involved testing organizational
resources. These variables included physical resources (i.e., capital spending and urban/
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suburban location), intangible resources (i.e., organizational age and direct medical
expenses), and financial resources (i.e., current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio).
Although HLM and ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions are equivalent in
terms o f a level-1 model, HLM does not provide for a straightforward method for
calculating the percentage o f variance explained comparable to an OLS R2. While some
formulas for approximating the variance explained exist (cf. Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992),
estimates from these methods are problematic (Kreft & De Leeuw, 1998). Because
significance is only found for level-1 variables, I report results from OLS regression
analysis for their simplicity o f estimation and interpretation. These results are displayed
in table 6. Overall, financial resources (i.e., current ratio and debt-to-assets ratio)
significantly predicted financial performance (i.e., ROA). R2 estimates for ROA,
occupancy, and admissions per bed were .26, .09, and .12 percent respectively.
Table 6. Regression Results for Organizational Resources
ROA
Occupancy
Admissions
_____________________________ per Bed
t
t
t
P
P
P
1.43
.65
.15
.05
.22t
1.93
Capital Spending
Urban/ Suburban
-.08
-.71
.13
.27 -.20t -1.68
.50 .01
.06
.93
.50
Hospital Age
.06
Direct Medical Expenses
-.11
-1.06
.15
.16
.15
1.36
.29*
2.33 -.18
Current Ratio
.18
.99
.13
-.2 I t
-1.70 -.27*
Debt-to-Assets
.05
.09
.68
df
(6,79)
(6,79)
(6,79)
R2
.26
.09
.12
F
4.69**
1.37
1.77
Notes: /i=86 tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.001
Step 2 in the evaluation o f hypothesis 2 utilizes HLM to explore the influence o f
strategic group characteristics after controlling for hospital characteristics. Results o f this
test indicate strategic group characteristics chosen for this study did not predict
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performance irrespective o f performance type (i.e., financial, effectiveness, efficiency).
The results of this analysis are displayed in Table 5. Hence, while step 1 indicated that
organizational characteristics do influence performance, strategic group characteristics
explored in step 2 held no additional explanatory power. Hypothesis 2, therefore, was
not supported.
Hypothesis 3 argued that strategic group characteristics moderate the extent to
which organizational level variables influence performance. The HLM results for this
analysis are displayed in table 7. Because none of the cross-level interaction terms were
significance, hypothesis 3 was not supported.
In sum, results o f hypothesis 1 detected variance in organizational performance
both within and between strategic groups. Further, evidence used to test hypothesis 2
suggests that resources are useful in explaining a considerable amount o f that variance.
This finding is especially strong for financial performance (i.e., ROA). This analysis
complements the variance components results that found most o f the variance in financial
performance exists at the organizational level. Group characteristics, however, explained
no additional variance above organizational resources tested at the organizational level.
Post Hoc Analysis (Strategic Groups and Performance)
To further understandings o f the effects o f strategic group membership among
hospitals, 1 conducted additional post hoc analysis to detect performance differences
among strategic groups. Because o f the post hoc nature o f this test, the results cannot be
viewed as definitive; however, this additional inquiry may be useful in identifying
“possibilities” associated with group influences on performance. Also, results o f this test
add to the body o f research that seeks to understand the influence of group membership
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Table 7. Tests of Group (i.e., moderation) Effects on Organizational Resources
(p-values)
ROA

Occupancy

Admissions
per bed

Percentage o f routine patient days
1.00
1.38
1.39
Capital Spending (yi 1)
1.24
1.21
1.08
Urban/ Suburban (721)
1.01
1.12
1.28
Hospital Age (731)
1.00
1.24
.22
Direct Medical Expenses (741)
.16
1.14
1.13
Current Ratio (751)
1.06
1.07
1.29
Debt-to-Assets (y6i)
Numbers o f services
1.39
1.00
1.38
Capital Spending (712)
1.38
1.27
1.08
Urban/ Suburban (722)
1.04
1.01
1.39
Hospital Age (732)
1.00
1.39
.31
Direct Medical Expenses (742)
.18
1.27
1.27
Current Ratio (752)
1.04
.80
1.09
Debt-to-Assets (762)
Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital resources are group mean centered,
while group characteristics are uncentered.
(Coefficients)
ROA
Percentage o f routine patient days
Capital Spending (711)
Urban/ Suburban (721)
Hospital Age (731)
Direct Medical Expenses (741)
Current Ratio (751)
Debt-to-Assets (y6i)
Numbers o f services
Capital Spending (712)
Urban/ Suburban (722)
Hospital Age (732)
Direct Medical Expenses (742)
Current Ratio (752)
Debt-to-Assets (762)

Occupancy

Admissions
per bed

.00
-1.98
.00
.00
-.01
-.02

.00
1.53
.01
-.00
-.68
1.04

-.00
-88.87
-2.13
.01
87.89
664.85

.00
-.01
.00
.00
-.01
-.02

.00
.01
.00
.00
-.00
.01

.00
-.46
-.01
.00
.33
3.00

Notes: No significant coefficients found. Hospital resources are group mean centered,
while group characteristics are uncentered.
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on organizational performance (Bantel, 1998; Cool & Schendel, 1987; Ketchen et al.,
1993; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989).
The MANOVA significance test used to validate cluster solutions detected
differences in performance based on group membership. Financial performance (i.e.,
ROA), organizational effectiveness (i.e., occupancy), and organizational efficiency (i.e.,
admissions per bed) were all dependent variables in this analysis. This test was therefore
followed up with univariate ANOVAs in this post hoc analysis to profile differences
among performance measures. The results o f this analysis, as well as the means for each
group along each performance measure are displayed in table 8. The univariate ANOVA
tests were significant for nonfinancial performance measures. Specifically, “defenders”
performed significantly better in terms of effectiveness (i.e., occupancy) while
“prospectors” fared better in terms of efficiency (i.e., admissions per bed). In contrast,
groups did not differ significantly for financial performance (i.e., ROA). This finding is
consistent with results o f hypothesis 1 that detected little variation in financial
performance that is attributed to the group level o f analysis.
Table 8. Post Hoc Strategic Groups Analysis (Means)

Defenders
Balancers
Prospectors
Univariate ANOVAs
(F statistic)
*p<0.005 **p<0.001

ROA Occupancy
.02
76.68
-.01
68.58
.02
75.95
2.17
6.83*

Admissions per Bed
22.15
35.36
37.20
23.86**

Discussion
Managers face a delicate balance between positioning their organizations uniquely
in their competitive environments while simultaneously maintaining awareness o f
competitors whose actions are worthy of imitation. The thesis o f this paper has been that
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both o f these factors - a firm’s distinct uniqueness and how a firm is positioned within a
group o f similarly acting competitors - are critical determinants o f organizational
performance. In the following sections I elaborate on how both o f these areas of
managerial focus are important for explaining differences in organizational performance.
I then discuss limitations o f this research and suggest directions for future inquiry.
Multiple Performance Influences
For two o f the three performance measures, the analysis revealed significant
variation in both the organizational and group levels. Hence, it appears that both
organizational uniqueness and group membership can be used to explain performance
differences among organizations. This finding builds upon a growing body o f work in
the strategy literature that has focused on examining the degree to which firm or industry
“drives” performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels,
1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991;
Schmalensee, 1985). None o f these studies, however, have accessed the degree to which
the strategic group level of analysis influences this variance. Based on the variance in
performance found in this study, it seems that previous research has been underspecified
and ignored an important dimension of performance influence. Thus, our understanding
o f the true nature o f organizational performance has been limited. Perhaps this is one
reason why this body o f research continues to be plagued by equivocal findings.
For organizational effectiveness (i.e., occupancy), group differences accounted for
roughly ten percent o f this variance. For organizational efficiency (i.e., admissions per
bed), group membership explained a considerable forty percent o f the performance
differences. These findings support a small body o f research that suggests strategic group
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membership as well as organizational positioning can have an important bearing on
organizational processes and outcomes, including performance (e.g., Reger & Huff,
1993). As well, these results are consistent with others who found strategic groups
influence performance when the strategic group definition is based on a deductively
defined framework (Bantel, 1998; Dess & Davis, 1984; Ketchen et al., 1993). However,
the finding that strategic group membership is relevant for explaining nonfinancial
elements o f performance is in contrast to results by Nath and Sudharshan (1994). Using
multiple indicators to measure financial decisions, production/ operations strategy,
human resources, and business strategy they found no significant differences in
occupancy across the inductively defined strategic groups in their healthcare sample.
Despite the general finding that variance in hospital performance exists at the
group and organizational levels, not all the performance measures were supported. In
particular, nearly all the variance in hospital financial performance (i.e., ROA) was
attributed to the organizational level o f analysis. One explanation for this result is that
because health care providers encompass organizations with both for-profit and not-forprofit orientations, profitability measures such as ROA may be less salient performance
measures for some hospital managers (Kumar, Subramanian, & Yauger, 1998). Most o f
the firms in this sample are in fact not-for-profit hospitals. Thus, the considerable
variation in ROA may be dependent on “for-profit status” - an organizational
characteristic.
Lack of Group Main and Moderating Effects
Results failed to confirm hypotheses 2 and 3 that explored the role of strategic
group characteristics on organizational performance. However, several possible
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explanations for these results seem plausible. First, the lack o f significant group main
effects while controlling for firm resources might suggests that the characteristics used to
define group membership are not the same group factors that explain organizational
performance. The variables used to cluster organizations in this study were based on
theoretical guidance from Zammuto’s (1988) typology derived from a synthesis of
strategic choice and population ecology literatures. However, future research may
benefit by exploring factors that are unique to each group, such as bargaining power over
buyers and suppliers. Such factors may provide mobility barriers that enhance
performance beyond organizational resources. Thus, future research should explore the
role o f strategic group variables other than those used to define group membership.
Results in this study did not support the hypothesis that group characteristics
moderated the relationships between firm resources and performance. If group
characteristics do not moderate the relationships between resources and performance, it
seems that in this sample, resource value is better understood in terms of an
organization’s unique positioning o f resources within the industry, irregardless o f
differences from the group. Thus, future research might benefit from an examination o f
how industry characteristics may moderate the relationship between firm resources and
performance.
The lack of significance for the group measures should by no means be
interpreted as a lack o f support for the importance o f group membership. Clearly, the
variance components analysis as well as post hoc analysis suggests that some o f
organizational performance is a function o f groups. The typology used in this study,
however, may warrant further scrutiny in this unique industry context. While Zammuto’s
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(1988) original classification scheme proposed four distinct types of firms, I detected
evidence for only three groups in this industry. O f the three, only two clearly followed
the strategies indicated by the juxtaposition o f strategic choice and population ecology
espoused by Zammuto (1988). While this finding casts doubt on the veracity o f certain
specifics provided by the typology, results were nonetheless informative. Evidence from
post hoc tests provided evidence that hospital performance may depend on consistent
commitment to a clear strategy. Indeed, the hospitals that committed to either defender
or prospector strategies outperformed the balancer group in this sample. This supports
Zammuto’s (1988) more general assertion that to be successful organizations need to
focus on innovation or efficiency, but not both.
Future research should continue to explore alternative definitions o f the strategic
group construct. Perhaps researchers in strategic groups have been too specific in their
approach to grouping firms. Indeed, much criticism has been levied against inductive
approaches that focus on rich contextual understandings to the detriment of more
generalizable insights (e.g., Ketchen et al., 1993). While the classification scheme used
in this study sought to ameliorate this problem by simplifying the industry into four
distinct groups, perhaps the typology did not go far enough in its simplification efforts.
A return to an ever more basic categorization such as innovation versus efficiency would
serve to tie the strategic groups literature back to more traditional classification schemes
such as Bums and Stalker’s (1961) typology o f mechanistic and organic systems. Future
research should explore these as well as other classification schemes that may provide
insights across multiple industry contexts.
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The Importance o f Organizational Resources
To further understanding o f resource-based influences on performance, Rouse and
Daellenbach (1999) proposed a systematic process where researchers sample from a
single industry, group firms based on a group typology, and profile performance
differences within and between groups. This study draws from their suggestions to
provide for a sophisticated test o f their procedure, and allow for rich understandings of
the efficacy o f firm resource holdings. Substantial variance in hospital performance was
explained by testing organizational resource variables. More than 25% o f the variance in
financial performance (i.e., ROA) was explained by the organizational resources
measured in this study. Thus, while group variables did not explain variance in hospital
performance in the HLM results, the firm resource variables (i.e., current ratio and debtto-assets) explained substantial performance variation using OLS regression. The RBV is
often criticized because its tenets are a challenge to operationalize (Yeoh & Roth, 1999).
This study is one o f a few empirical attempts to investigate the RBV. By doing so, it
advances knowledge o f resource holdings in an important industry context.
Our understanding of organizational performance may be aided by profiling the
types o f resources that affected various performance measures. Financial resource
measures were significant for financial performance (i.e., ROA). Specifically, hospitals
with high liquidity (i.e. current ratio) and low debt-to-assets outperformed other hospitals.
This finding has implications for researchers of organizational slack. The direct
influence o f slack resources on performance has been unclear in the literature (Cyert &
March, 1963), with some arguing that slack allows for innovative actions that lead to
performance (Bourgeois, 1981; Singh, 1986) while others asserting a negative
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relationship between slack resources and performance because slack is essentially
“waste” (Antle & Fellingham, 1990). Results o f this study are consistent with those of
Bromiley (1991) who found a positive relationship between slack and performance (as
measured by current ratio and debt-to-equity). In the changing hospital environment
investigated in this study, accruing slack resources seems critical to achieving superior
financial performance.
Finally, results o f this study suggest that the effect o f resources is dependent on
the type of performance being considered. Thus, managers must carefully monitor and
accumulate resources needed to achieve their specific performance goals. For example,
financial resources significantly predicted financial performance (i.e., ROA), but did not
significantly effect nonfinancial measures (i.e., occupancy and admissions per bed).
Empirical evidence supports the notion that the efficacy o f certain resources may be
context specific and vary across industry settings (Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998).
Empirical evidence from this study demonstrates a more puzzling relationship - the value
o f certain resources also varies based on performance measure. This may be problematic
for organizational functioning because mangers may become extremely efficient in
achieving the wrong performance goals. Thus, an extention o f this research could focus
on how the salience o f certain performance measures over others alters manager’s
decisions to accumulate certain types o f resources and how those decisions affect
subsequent performance.
Limitations and Directions for Future Research
Several limitations specific to this study should be noted. First, the decision to
control for industry limits the generalizability o f study results. Thus, future research
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should examine organizational, group, as well as industry influences on performance. A
steady stream of research has examined firm and industry influences on firm
performance, and to date has received equivocal results. By including the strategic group
level of analysis, future research can develop a more realistic model o f multiple firm
performance influences.
Future research should also incorporate additional measures at the group level of
analysis that may be critical for predicting variance in performance. I chose to rely on
the variables used to define clusters as the measures that may explain organizational
performance beyond organizational resources. Other group level variables, however,
may be more useful towards explaining organizational performance. Researchers should
encourage the discovery and use o f such measures. For example, measures o f mobility
barriers or group bargaining ability might be included in future research efforts.
Conclusion
Understanding the determinants of organizational performance remains one o f the
central goals of the strategy field. Combining elements o f the RBV and SGR suggests
that both views aids in this endeavor. This study is the first to explore how much
variance in organizational performance organizational and group levels o f analysis
explain. One particular finding o f interest is that the amount o f variance at each level
differs based on performance measure. Overall, findings from this study encourage
researchers to look at multiple levels o f analysis using multiple performance measures to
provide a more comprehensive, albeit complex, understanding o f multiple influences on
organizational performance.
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A MULTILEVEL EXAMINATION OF RESOURCE-BASED, STRATEGIC
GROUP, AND INDUSTRY INFLUENCES ON FIRM PERFORMANCE
Understanding the determinants of firm performance has been a central interest o f
strategy researchers since the origin o f the field in the 1960s (Rumelt et al., 1994).
Strategy researchers have traditionally approached this research question in a more
holistic approach than other disciplines — incorporating insights from psychology,
economics, finance, marketing, and administrative management (Jemison, 1981a, 1981b;
Rumelt et al., 1994; Summer et al., 1990). Indeed, one “distinctive competence” o f
strategic management research is the blending o f multiple theoretical perspectives to aid
in answering interesting and practical research questions such as the determinants o f firm
performance (Meyer, 1991). The incorporation o f multiple theoretical approaches can
provide the basis for rich descriptions of organizational antecedents, actions, and
outcomes (Combs & Ketchen, 1999).
Efforts to study the determinants of firm performance have generally focused on
three influential levels of analysis: firm, industry, and strategic group (McGee & Thomas,
1986). Researchers following the resource-based view o f the firm (Barney, 1991;
Wemerfelt, 1984) argue that the heterogeneity o f firm resources is an important strategic
factor that can differentially influence firm performance. Thus, performance differences
emanate from firm resource differences. Strategic groups research has argued that firms
following similar strategies may benefit from group characteristics that enable them to
generate superior performance compared to others in the same industry (e.g., Dranove et
al., 1998; Porter, 1979; Reger & Huff, 1993). Under this view, analysis o f groups o f
firms within the same industry can be beneficial. Drawing on considerable economic
research (e.g., Bain, 19S6,1959; Mason, 1939), researchers in strategic management also
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agree that industry membership wields considerable influence on firm performance
(Keats & Hitt, 1988; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Porter, 1980; Rumelt, 1991).
When used in isolation, each o f these views provides a partial explanation o f why
firms differ in terms o f performance. Within a given study, however, the exclusion of
key influences leads to a host o f theoretical and empirical problems. Conceptually,
overlooking one or more views detracts from our understanding of which level o f
influence is more important in determining firm performance — an issue some have
argued is at the very heart of the field (Keats & Hitt, 1988). Methodologically, studies
focusing on only one level o f analysis limit the interpretability o f previous research. For
example, if groups and industries influence performance, studies conducted at the
individual firm level o f analysis have violated the independence o f observations
assumption that underlies traditional statistical techniques (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992;
Hofmann, 1997). As well, if industry matters, studies focusing only on strategic group
explanations are also subject to this criticism. One the other hand, studies that focus
solely on higher levels, such as industries or strategic groups may be criticized because
they overlook potentially meaningful lower level variance that exists among firms. A
better understanding o f the “true” nature o f firm performance could by gained if
researchers heeded calls to incorporate multiple levels o f analysis (Henderson &
Mitchell, 1997; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999).
I take the position that understanding the relative influences o f multiple levels of
analysis can be advanced by examining firm, strategic group, and industry influences on
firm performance simultaneously. Such an analysis is needed to enhance our
understanding o f strategic group relationships in tandem with firm and industry effects
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(Cool & Schendel, 1988; Dranove et al., 1998; Mehra, 1996). As well, this approach
provides a broader picture o f the multiple influences on firm performance. Examining
multilevel influences on firm performance in a single model will shed light on two basic
research questions. First, I will determine how much variance in firm performance is
explained by each level o f analysis (i.e., firm, strategic group, industry), providing
evidence for which level “matters” the most (cf. Rumelt, 1991). Second, I will test the
extent to which key variables at each level o f analysis are responsible for explaining
variance in firm performance. By taking this approach, I hope to provide insights
concerning which level o f analysis is more important, as well as specifics about how and
why variables at each level o f analysis influence performance.
Literature Review
Multilevel Influences on Performance
The merits o f incorporating multiple levels o f analysis have been hailed by
numerous scholars in the field of management in general (Hofmann, 1997; House,
Rousseau, & Thomas-Hunt, 1995; Klein, Dansereau, & Hall, 1994; Klein, Tosi, &
Cannella, 1999; Morgeson & Hofmann, 1999) and strategy in particular (Dranove et al.,
1998; Henderson & Mitchell, 1997; Rouse & Daellenbach, 1999). Investigations about
level o f analysis effects on firm performance represent an important exchange o f ideas in
strategic management research. Indeed, a rich history in the strategy literature has tested
the disparate influences o f firm and industry effects to determine which level o f analysis
is more important for understanding firm performance (Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush
et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996;
Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985).
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While firm and industry characteristics represent two driving forces behind firm
performance (Mauri & Michaels, 1998), some strategy researchers have argued that
another level o f analysis — the strategic group — is also worthy o f investigation (Hunt,
1972; Porter, 1979). Strategic groups are intraindustry groups o f firms making similar
decisions in key areas (Porter, 1980; Reger & Huff, 1993). Numerous group traits such
as shared identity (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997), strategy (Dess & Davis, 1984), bargaining
power (Dranove et al., 1998) and mobility barriers (Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Porter,
1979) can influence managers’ interpretations and actions. Despite numerous studies that
have found a relationship between group membership and performance (e.g., Dess &
Davis, 1984; Fiegenbaum & Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996; Nath & Gruca, 1997; Reger &
Huff, 1993), integration o f the strategic group construct into investigations o f firm and
industry influences on performance has been scant (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Rouse &
Daelenbach, 1999). While a handful o f studies have acknowledged firm differences exist
within strategic groups (e.g., Cool & Shendel, 1988; Lawless et al., 1989; Reger & Huff,
1993), no study to date has simultaneously measured firm, strategic group, and industry
influences on firm performance. Given that there is a wealth of conceptual evidence that
firm differences as well as strategic group and industry membership play a role in
determining firm performance differences (Dranove et al, 1998), I hypothesize the
following,
Hypothesis 1: Firms, strategic groups, and industries explain unique components o f the
variance in firm performance.
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Strategic Group Characteristics Influence Performance
While understanding the extent to which firms, strategic groups, and industries
explain variation in firm performance can provide a valuable contribution to the
literature, further insights can be gained by understanding how variables at each level of
analysis influence performance. O f specific interest is the influence o f strategic group
membership on performance. Strategic groups researchers have implicitly argued for a
direct link between group membership and performance. Group membership in and of
itself, however, is not directly responsible for differentiating groups in terms of
performance. Instead, it is likely that persistent structural features such as mobility
barriers in certain key areas make group membership more attractive in some groups over
others (Caves & Porter, 1977; Dranove et al., 1998; Mehra, 1996). Other specific group
traits might include group bargaining ability (Dranove et al., 1998), or a strong group
reputation or image (Peteraf & Shanley, 1997). Thus, the advantage o f group
membership is a function o f specific characteristics that define the group. These
characteristics have been labeled as strategic industry factors, or resources that are
valuable within an industry (as opposed to idiosyncratic resources) (Amit & Schoemaker,
1993; Mehra, 1996).
Our understanding o f firm performance can be improved by testing strategic
group characteristics that may influence performance. Traditionally, this has been
accomplished by a two stage process where firms are first clustered into groups based on
hypothesized characteristics and those groups are tested for performance differences.
Some researchers, however, have criticized results o f this strategy as being theoretically
bankrupt (Barney & Hoskisson, 1990). Consequently, some have argued that future
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research in the strategic groups literature should offer a more rigorous test of the effects
o f strategic group characteristics on firm performance that first controls for the effects o f
firm resources (Dranove et al., 1998). The most straightforward test under this paradigm
would measure the influence o f distinctively group characteristics while holding the
influence o f firm resources constant. Thus,
Hypothesis 2: Strategic group characteristics have a direct (i.e., main) effect on firm
performance beyond that accounted for by firm resources.
Group membership may also have an indirect affect on firm performance by
changing the nature of the relationship between firm resources and performance within a
group. The idea that certain resources are more critical in some strategic groups than in
others is consistent with Porter’s (1980) view that firm’s will be positioned within their
strategic groups based on “structural” differences. While all firms within a strategic
group may receive some benefit from group membership, resource heterogeneity may
influence within group performance differences (Cool & Schendel, 1988). Indeed, Reger
and Huff (1993) found that firms closely representing the group’s “core” defining traits
outperformed firms following the group recipe less consistently. This notion is backed
by considerable theoretical and empirical evidence stemming from the resource-based
view that differences in firm resources and assets are critical determinants of firm
performance differences (e.g., Amit & Schoemaker, 1993; Barney, 1991; Dierickx &
Cool, 1989; Lawless etal., 1989; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Wemerfelt, 1984).
Despite conceptual and empirical evidence that both firm resources as well as
group characteristics influence firm performance, little guidance has been given about the
form o f the relationship between resources, strategic group membership, and
performance. I take the position that strategic group membership moderates the
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relationship between firm resources and performance. That is, characteristics o f the
group alter the efficacy o f firm resources to enhance performance. For example, firms
overcoming substantial mobility barriers in marketing and R&D to position themselves
into a group will likely find it more difficult to differentiate their firms on these
characteristics within the group. Stated formally,
Hypothesis 3: Strategic group characteristics moderate the relationship between firm
resources and performance.
Industry Influences on Performance
Contextual differences stemming from industry effects have also played a key role
in strategic management investigations o f firm performance (Dess, Ireland, & Hitt, 1990;
Hamel & Prahalad, 1994; Wiersema & Bantel, 1993). Industry characteristics can
influence strategic perspectives (Sutcliffe & Huber, 1998), actions (Slevin & Covin,
1997) and outcomes (Dess et al., 1990; Li & Simerly, 1998). Industry conditions may
make certain types o f strategic groups more likely to achieve superior performance. Most
strategic groups researchers, however, have explicitly controlled for contextual industry
influences by investigating groups through rich analysis o f a single industry setting (e.g.,
Houthoofd & Heene, 1997; Lewis & Thomas, 1990; Mascarenhas & Aaker, 1989; Mehra,
1996).
While most empirical research on strategic groups has sidestepped the influence
of industry characteristics on performance, Ketchen, Thomas, & Snow (1993) provided
some general ideas about how industry conditions may favor one strategic group over
another. Specifically, they argued that in environments characterized by low
munificence, “specialist” groups focusing on narrow product offering will outperform
“generalists” that operate in a broad domain. As well, they assert that in dynamic
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environments, firms focusing on capitalizing on new opportunities will outperform firms
who focus on exploiting existing opportunities. While they found some support for their
assertions, their use o f a single industry did not allow for examination o f the effects of
variance in munificence and dynamism in a multi-industry setting. Thus, while evidence
has raised the possibility that industry characteristics may influence strategic group
membership on performance, a true moderated relation has not been tested empirically.
Because little theoretical guidance suggests how industry characteristics influence
strategic group performance, I propose the following hypothesis in its most general form,
Hypothesis 4: Industry characteristics moderate the influence o f strategic group
characteristics on firm performance.
Method
Sample
I drew my sample from the COMPUSTAT database. Compiled by Standard &
Poor’s, COMPUSTAT includes accounting and financial data on over 7,000 companies
in more than 300 industries. COMPUSTAT has been a well established database in
strategic management because researchers gathering data from COMPUSTAT can be
assured that data are comparable across companies and industries (Davis & Duhaime,
1992; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). Because o f the interest in examining multilevel
influences on firm performance, I restrict my sample to firms that operate in a single
business segment to eliminate statistical noise that would occur if I attempted to measure
diversified firms operating in multiple industries (cf. Mauri & Michaels, 1998). Also, the
use o f nondiversified firms eliminates any confounding that would occur if diversified
firms were placed into strategic groups.
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A lagged structure was employed to improve the ability to make causal inferences
about multilevel influences on firm performance (cf. Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Firm
resources, strategic group traits, and industry characteristics were measured with data
taken from the years 1991-1995, and firm performance variables were averaged from the
years 1993-1997. The decision to use five years for firm resources, group traits, and
industry characteristics was driven by the need to have data for the standard five-year
time frame used to analyze industry characteristics (cf. Keats & Hitt, 1988; Weinzimmer
et al., 1998) as well as to provide a stable basis for comparing competitive strategies (cf.
Miles et al., 1993). Five years o f performance data are also necessary to provide a stable
measure o f firm performance (cf. Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996; Keats & Hitt, 1988).
Three years of data overlap were chosen because some resources may have immediate
effects on firm performance, while others may take a number of years before their
performance affects are fully realized (cf. Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). The years 19911997 were selected because they were the most recent available from COMPUSTAT.
The sample was drawn from several manufacturing industries to enhance
generalizabilty about firm, strategic group, and industry influences on firm performance.
In addition to the single business requirement, the sample was further restricted to
industries with a minimum o f 45 firms to have the statistical power needed to detect a
medium strategic group effect (Ferguson & Ketchen, 1999). This requirement also
avoids biasing the sample to only find firm effects. Specifically, I sample from twelve
four-digit SIC industries where competition is dominated by single business firms.
Industries consisting primarily o f undiversified firms tend to be less mature, younger, and
relatively unconsolidated. The specific industries sampled include pharmaceutical
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preparations (SIC = 2834), in vitro/ vivo diagnostics (SIC = 2835), biological products
(SIC = 2836), special industry machinery (SIC = 3559), computer communication
equipment (SIC = 3576), computer periphery equipment (SIC = 3577), television and
telegraph apparatus (SIC = 3661), radio, television broadcasting, and communication
equipment (SIC = 3663), semiconductor related devices (SIC = 3674), surgical, medical
equipment and apparatus (SIC = 3841), electromedical apparatus (SIC = 3845), and
prepackaged software (SIC = 7372), bringing the total analysis sample to 1,163 firms.
Firm Resource Measures
A number o f firm resource categorizations have been presented in the literature
(Black & Boal, 1994). I rely on the classification o f Chatteijee and Wemerfelt (1991),
which places firm resources into three categories: physical, intangible, and financial.
This classification is well grounded in the literature (e.g., MacDonald, 1984;
Montgommery & Hariharan, 1990; Teece, 1982) and remains a popular resource
classification framework (e.g., Schoenecker & Cooper, 1998). To operationalize firm
resources, I selected multiple measures from each o f these categories. As well, I selected
measures with the requirement that they are useful in representing firm resources, yet are
not idiosyncratic to any one industry (cf. Miles et al., 1993).
Physical resources. Physical resources encompass the firm’s physical
technology, plant and equipment, geographic location, and access to raw materials
(Barney, 1991). I use two indicators to measure physical resources. First, I use capital
intensity, defined as capital expenditures divided by sales. A firm that makes a consistent
commitment to capital expenditures is continually building their property, plant and
equipment. As well, capital investment is a measure o f business strategy that has been
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shown to have a strong relationship with firm performance across studies (e.g., Capon,
Farley, & Hoenig, 1990; Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). To capture geographic location I
use the percentage o f domestic sales divided by total sales. A company with a high
percentage o f domestic sales is less likely to have global operations, and more likely to
focus on domestic customers and suppliers o f raw materials.
Intangible resources. To conduct a thorough operationalization o f intangible
resources, I include both purchasable and nonpurchasable intangible resources in my
analysis. First, I use the number of patents granted to the firm between 1991 and 1995,
available from the CASSIS database from the Patent and Trademark Office o f the U.S.
Department of Commerce (Penner-Hahn, 1998). Because patent protection provides the
owner with exclusive rights to make, use and sell the patented invention for more than a
decade, a patent is an intangible resource that can be used by firms to achieve a sustained
competitive advantage (Hall, 1992,1993).
While patents and other technology resources can be purchased in the open
market, a company’s reputation is an intangible resource which can not be bought or sold,
and usually has to be earned over a long period o f time (Hall, 1992). A corporation’s
reputation consists o f a set o f attributes inferred from the firm’s past actions and ascribed
to the firm (Weigelt & Camerer, 1988). To operationalize reputation I use ratings
available from Standard & Poor’s (Fombrum, 1996). As one o f the top three ratings
agencies, reputation measures derived from ratings agencies like Standard & Poor’s are
appropriate forjudging general perceptions o f company reputation, and are especially
helpful for rating performance potential (Fombrum, 1996). Such ratings are based on a
long-term perspective that extends beyond a brief earnings periods (Fombrum, 1996).
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Reputational measures from financial ratings agencies are appropriate forjudging
reputation due to their access to information such as minutes o f board meetings, profit
breakdowns by product, and new product plans (Ederington & Goh, 1998; Ederington &
Yawitz, 1987). While few ratings are available that are meaningful for multiple
industries, Standard and Poor’s ratings available on COMPUSTAT provide a yearly
average of multiple analyst’s projections concerning the firms potential earnings (i.e.,
earnings per share). I measure reputation as the average qualified opinion from 1991 to
1995.
Financial resources. Liquidity ratios are commonly used to identify a firm’s
availability o f financial resources (Chatteijee & Wemerfelt, 1991; Palepu, 1986).
Available financial resources provide the means for achieving strategic flexibility that
can enhance organizational performance (Greenley & Oktemgil, 1998). Following
Chatteijee and Wemerfelt (1991), I use the current ratio to measure financial resources.
The current ratio is calculated by dividing current assets by current liabilities and
represents a firm’s liquidity, or the ability to pay bills and other immediate debts. A
second measure of financial resources used in this study is leverage. In particular, I
measure the debt-to-equity ratio, which indicates the potential to generate financial
resources in the future (Bromiley, 1991).
Performance
Firm performance is a concept with a substantial number o f possible indicators
(Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986). Hence, several distinct measures will be used here
to operationalize the multifaceted nature o f firm performance (i.e., accounting-based and
market-based). First, I will use return on assets (ROA) because this measure has been

82

Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

used as an indicator o f performance in several multilevel studies o f firm performance
(e.g., Brush et al., 1999; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Rumelt, 1991),
and has often been the sole measure of firm performance in many o f these studies (e.g.,
Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Rumelt, 1991;
Schmalensee, 1985). I supplement this accounting-based measure with return on
investment (ROI), and return on equity (ROE). I measure market-based performance
with the price-eamings ratio (PE)(cf. Lewis & Thomas, 1990; Mehra, 1996). Finally,
Altman’s Z is a measure o f bankruptcy propensity, and is useful for understanding firm
survival (Altman, Avery, Eisenbeis, & Sinkey, 1981).
Strategic Group Measures and Clustering Procedure
The evolution o f configuration analysis has produced two distinct approaches
(Bantel, 1998; Ketchen et al., 1993). The inductive approach focuses on empirically
derived configurations appropriate for a given context. In contrast, the deductive
approach is a theory driven approach that can be applied to a wide variety of industry
contexts (Ketchen et al., 1993). Because my interest is examining multiple strategic
groups within a number o f industries, I rely on the deductive approach for its superior
generalizability.
While other deductive approaches have been used in the literature (e.g., Dess &
Davis, 1984), the deductive approach used here relies on two theoretical perspectives at
the heart of organizational analysis — strategic choice (Child, 1972; Miles & Snow,
1978) and organizational ecology (Hannan & Freeman, 1977). The basic premise o f this
approach is that a firm’s strategy varies on two independent competitive dimensions
derived from these theories (Zammuto, 1988). The first dimension relates to a firm’s
competitive advantage, expressed at the ability to exploit new opportunities. This may be
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accomplished by being first to market, or otherwise exploiting a new market quickly.
The second dimension focuses on breadth of operations. This dimension includes
number of distributors, geographic or product scope, and market growth/ share goals
(Bantel, 1998). A strong competence in only one o f these dimensions is needed for
sustained competitive advantage.
Combining these two dimensions results in four distinct quadrants that closely
parallel the Miles and Snow (1978) typology. The first quadrant is represented by
defenders/ K-specialists, who focus on existing opportunities in a narrow domain. The
second quadrant encompasses entrepreneurs/ r-specialists, who pursue existing
opportunities in a narrow domain. Analyzers/ K-generalists, efficiently exploit existing
opportunities in a broad domain. Finally, prospectors/ r-generalists, pursue new
opportunities in a broad domain.
I use two measures to cluster strategic groups along each o f the competitive
dimensions developed by Zammuto (1988). To measure competitive advantage, I use
R&D intensity (cf. Bantel, 1998). A firm that makes a significant, consistent investment
to R&D has the capability to create an innovation or be an early follower (Schoenecker &
Cooper, 1998). I measure R&D intensity as the average R&D expenditure divided by
sales for the years 1991-1995 (Bierly & Chakrabarti, 1996). To measure breadth of
operations, 1 use the number o f trademarks the firm holds. Trademarks proxy for
operations breadth because firms with a large number o f trademarks are likely to be
involved in the production o f numerous products, services, or devices (Cohen, 1986,
1991; Hall, 1992). Conversely, firms that hold few trademarks are more likely to focus
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their operations on a narrow niche market. Thus, trademarks capture a number of
unobservables associated with competitive scope.
A two-stage clustering procedure was used to cluster the firms in the analysis
(Hair, Anderson, Tatham, & Black, 1992; Ketchen & Shook, 1996). A two-stage process
is valuable because it increases the validity of cluster solutions (Ketchen & Shook, 1996;
Milligan, 1980; Punj & Stewart, 1983). This procedure first uses hierarchical clustering
to determine the number o f groups and their cluster centroids (i.e., Ward’s method) and
then uses the results as the starting point for a nonhierarchical clustering (i.e., K-means).
Criterion validity was assessed through MANOVA significance tests with the
performance variables used in this study (Ketchen & Shook, 1996). After deriving
groups, the group means for each o f the variables in the cluster analysis were used as
level-2 variables in the hierarchical linear modeling analysis, described later.
Industry Measures
Adequate measures for industry effects have been absent from much of the
strategy literature (Dess et al., 1990). To provide a complete picture o f the industry level
of analysis I followed two procedures. First, I stratified the sample by industry to ensure
that samples coincide with the variables and relationships examined in the study
(Harrigan, 1983). Second, I used the environmental dimensions o f munificence,
dynamism, and complexity developed by Dess and Beard (1984). These measures
provide continuous estimates o f several environmental dimensions that a number of
researchers in the field agree capture multiple environmental dimensions in a
parsimonious fashion (Dess et al., 1990; Keats & Hitt, 1988). As well, these measures
have been used in previous studies o f multilevel influences on firm performance (e.g.,
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Keats & Hitt, 1988; Lawless & Finch, 1989; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999; Sharfman &
Dean, 1991; Weinzimmer et al., 1998).
Industry munificence, or environmental growth, was calculated by regressing five
years o f industry sales data over time. The corresponding standardized coefficient (i.e.,
P) was used as the measure o f growth for each industry in the sample (cf. Boyd, 1995;
Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Weinzimmer et al., 1998; Wiersema & Bantel,
1993). Dynamism, or industry volatility, was operationalized as the standard error o f the
regression coefficient for the munificence equation previously described (cf. Dess &
Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988). The concept o f environmental complexity has been
described in many ways (Dess & Beard, 1984; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Porter, 1980),
although complexity has most commonly been operationalized as industry concentration
(e.g., Boyd, 1995; Keats & Hitt, 1988; Palmer & Wiseman, 1999). Highly concentrated
industries have few competitors, are fairly predictable and are low in complexity. In
contrast, industries marked by low concentration have many competitors, with
considerable activity that is difficult to monitor. Thus, I operationalize industry
complexity as the five-year average of each industry’s four-firm concentration ratio (cf.
Eisenhardt & Schoonhoven, 1990; Pennings, 1981; Romanelli, 1989).
Hieararchical Linear Modeling Analysis
To model the effects o f multiple variables at each level o f analysis I use a three
level hierarchical linear modeling technique to conduct the statistical analysis (cf. Bryk &
Raudenbush, 1988,1992; Duncan, Jones, & Moon, 1996; Raudenbush, Rowan, &
Cheong, 1993; Raudenbush, Rowan, & Kang, 1991). Specifically, I use the HLM/3L
software package (Bryk et al., 1996). The use o f hierarchical linear modeling provides
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for improved estimation o f fixed effects, while simultaneously allowing for the
partitioning of variance-covariance components (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). While
variance components models have been used in a number o f strategic management
studies (e.g., Balakrishnan & Fox, 1993; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Rumelt, 1991;
Schmalensee, 1985), the HLM software package is advantageous because in addition to
estimating the variance that resides at each level, these models also allow for the
prediction of variance using multiple independent variables at each level of analysis
(Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Thus, this methodology is able to assess how important
each level is in explaining performance, as well as provide insights as to why each level is
important. Although hierarchical linear modeling techniques have recently appeared in
the management literature (e.g., Deadrick, Bennett, & Russell, 1997; Hofmann, 1997;
Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998; Kidwell et al., 1997), these techniques have yet to be utilized
in strategic management research. Details o f the HLM method and its associated tests are
provided in Appendix B.
Results
Table 9 reports the means, standard deviations, and correlations among level-1
(i.e., individual firm) variables. Table 10 reports the means, standard deviations and
correlations among level-3 (i.e., industry) variables. Table 11 presents the descriptive
statistics for dependent variables at the firm level o f analysis. Only two variables were
measured at the group level o f analysis. The correlation of -.23 between these variables
measured at level-2 (i.e., R&D Intensity and trademarks at the group level of analysis)
was insignificant (p = . 11).
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Table 9. Correlations Among Level-1 Independent Variables (COMPUSTAT Data)
Mean

1.
2.
3.
Standard
4.
5.
6.
deviation
1.77
6.79
1.00
1. Capital Intensity
10.27
.01
1.00
19.69
2. % Foreign Sales
2.56
5.89
-.04
.03
1.00
3. Patents
.27
.78
-.07
.21
.08
4. Reputation
1.00
3.84
.09
3.15
-.14
.13
-.28
1.00
5. Current Ratio
13.82
44.46
-.01
.04
.01
.11
-.07
1.00
6 . Debt-to-Equity
Notes: n = 1,163 Correlations above .05 are significant at the .05 level. Correlations
above .07 are significant at the .01 level
Table 10. Correlations Among Level-3 Independent Variables (COMPUSTAT Data)
Mean

Standard
Deviation
.91
.24
1.06
.05
.69
.18

I . Munificence
2. Dynamism
3. Complexity
/!= 12

1.

2.

1.00
-.04
-.27

1.00
.13

3.

1.00

Table 11. Correlations Among Level-1 Dependent Variables (COMPUSTAT
Mean

I.
2.
Standard
3.
Deviation
-16.14
31.77
1.00
l.R O A
-18.54
51.25
.57
1.00
2.RO I
-10.41
3. ROE
52.35
.39
.56
1.00
4.59
4. PE
22.61
.29
.19
.16
6.83
8.71
.15
.04
5. Altman’s Z
-.03
Correlations above .1 are significant at the .01 level

4.

1.00
.01

5.

1.00

Four strategic groups were detected in each industry. Results o f MANOVA
significance tests using firm performance measures support the validity o f cluster
solutions. The F tests from Wilks’ Lamda, provided by the MANOVA show highly
significant differences in performance based on group membership for all industries in
the sample (p<.001 ).
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The variance decomposition results for each of the performance measures used to
evaluate hypothesis 1 are found in table 12. For financial performance, ROA, ROI, and
ROE were measured. For ROA, 65.82% o f the variance was accounted for by
differences within strategic groups, 14.95% o f the variance was between strategic groups,
and 19.23% o f the variance was between industries. Using ROI, differences within
strategic groups accounted for 86.53% o f variance while differences among groups and
industries accounted for 3.4% and 10.07%, respectively. For ROE, 90.57% o f the
variance was accounted for by differences within strategic groups, .24% o f the variance
was between strategic groups, and 9.19% o f the variance was between industries.
Table 12. Decomposition of Variance-COMPUSTAT Data (No Predictors
Specified)

Level - 1 (Firm)
Level - 2 (Group)
Level - 3 (Industry)
Total

ROA
ROI
65.82
86.53
14.95
3.40
19.23
10.07
100%
100%

Altman’s Z
ROE
PE
96.08
90.57
95.74
2.59
.24
1.85
9.19
1.33
2.41
100%
100%
100%

The other types o f performance considered in this dissertation were market
performance and survival. For market performance, 95.74 percent o f the variance in PE
was within strategic groups, 1.85% o f the variance in firm performance was between
groups, and 2.41% o f the variance was between industries. Considering firm survival,
96.08% o f the variance in Altman’s Z was within groups, while 2.59% o f the variance in
this measure was between groups and 1.33% o f the variance was between industries.
Overall, variance in firm performance was detected at each level o f firm performance
(i.e., firm, strategic group, industry) across all performance measures. Even the .24% o f
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variance in ROE at the group level o f analysis was significant (p < .05), providing strong
support for hypothesis I.
Hypothesis 2 argued that strategic group characteristics would influence firm
performance above and beyond the influence o f firm resource variables. Results for the
tests o f this hypothesis are presented in table 13. For ROA, both group R&D Intensity
(i.e., source o f competitive advantage) and trademarks (i.e., breadth o f operations)
significantly predicted performance above and beyond firm resources (t = -5.22, pc.OOl
for R&D Intensity and t = 2.75, pc.Ol for trademarks). Group R&D Intensity (i.e.,
source of competitive advantage) was also a significant predictor of firm performance for
ROI (t = -2.82, p<.0l) and ROE (t = -2.62, p<.05). In contrast, trademarks (i.e., breadth
o f operations) did not significantly predict ROI (t = 1.38, p = .18) or ROE (t = .35, p =
.73).
Table 13. Test o f Group (i.e., main) Effects Controlling for Firm Resources
(t-values)
ROA
ROE
PE
Altman’s Z
ROI
-5.22***
-2.82**
-2.62*
.05 -2.68**
R&D Intensity (Poij)
2.75**
.04
.79
.18
.73
Trademarks (Po2j)
*p<0.05 **p<0.0l ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are grand mean centered, while strategic group characteristics are
uncentered
(Coefficients)
ROA
PE
ROI
ROE
Altman’s Z
.01
-1.18**
-1.07*
-.17**
R&D Intensity (potj) -1.34***
.99**
.01
.79
.18
.07
Trademarks (po2j)
*p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are grand mean centered, while strategic group characteristics are
uncentered
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For firm survival, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage)
significantly predicted Altman’s Z (t = -2.68, p<.01), while the influence of trademarks
(i.e., breadth of operations) was not significant (t = .79,p = .43). For market performance
(i.e., PE), however, group measures were not significant (t = .05, p = .96 for R&D
Intensity and t = .04, p = .97 for trademarks). Overall, mixed evidence is found for
hypothesis 2 .
Hypothesis 3 examined the degree to which group characteristics moderated
resource influences on firm performance. Results for these tests are presented in table 14.
Nine out o f sixty (15%) possible moderator terms were significant. Considering financial
performance, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage) moderated the
influence of intangible resources (i.e., patents and analysts’ ratings) on ROA (t = -2.02,
p<.05 for patents and t =-3.41, p<.00l for analysts’ ratings) and approached significance
for physical resources (i.e., percentage o f foreign sales; t = 1.69, p<.l). Also, group
trademarks (i.e., breadth of operations) moderated the effects of intangible resources (i.e.,
analysts’ ratings) influence on performance (t = -2.14, p<.05). For ROE, group R&D
Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage) moderated the effects o f financial
resources on performance (t = 2.28, p<.05 for current ratio and t = -1.71, pc.l for debt-toequity).
For market performance, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive
advantage) moderated intangible resources (i.e., analysts’ ratings; t = -2.13, p<.05)
influence on performance and group trademarks (i.e., breadth of operations) moderated
physical resource (i.e., percentage o f foreign sales) influence on the price-earnings ratio (t
= -1.94, p<.05). For organizational survival, group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of
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Table 14. Test of Group (i.e., moderation) Effects on Firm Resources
(t-values)
ROA

ROI

ROE

Altman’s Z

PE

R&D Intensity
.19
-.17
-.06
Capital Intensity (Pi ij) -.44
1.24
.35
.09
1.69+
% Foreign Sales (p 2ij)
-.99
.20
-2 .02 *
-1.17
Patents (p 3ij)
-.90
.17
-3.41***
-2.13*
Reputation (P4ij)
2.28*
.17
.69
-.84
Current Ratio (Psij)
-.08
1.00
1.12
-1.73+
Debt-to-equity (p 6ij)
Trademarks
-.34
-.31
-.11
.19
Capital Intensity (Pi2j)
1.14
.29
.96
-1.94*
% Foreign Sales (p22j)
.49
-.49
.01
.69
Patents (p 32j)
.07
-2.14*
-.96
.88
Reputation (P42j)
-.47
-.37
1.02
-1.17
Current Ratio (Ps2j)
-.55
.59
-.99
-.08
Debt-to-equity (p 62j)
tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.0l ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are group mean centered, while strategic group
uncentered

-2.52**
.51
1.37
1.58
- 1.02
-.71
.64
1.39
-.94
.60
-.12
-1.39
characteristics are

(Coefficients)
ROA

ROI

ROE

PE

Altman’s Z

R&D Intensity
.01
-.01
-.00
-.02 **
Capital Intensity (Pi ij) -.01
.03
.10
.00
.01
% Foreign Sales (p 2ij)
.07+
-.13
-. 12*
-.11
.01
.02
Patents (P3ij)
.13
-1.39***
-.69
-.71*
.19
Reputation (p 4ij)
.01
.07
.23*
-.04
-.02
Current Ratio (Psij)
-.00
.01
.01
-.00
-.03+
Debt-to-equity (p 6ij)
Trademarks
-.02
-.06
-.03
.02
.02
Capital Intensity ( p [2j)
.01
.01
.03
.01
-.02 *
% Foreign Sales (p 22j)
.00
.05
-.03
.03
-.01
Patents (P32j)
.05
-.84*
-.71
.29
.07
Reputation (P42j)
-.10
-.14
-.08
-.09
-.00
Current Ratio (p 52j)
-.01
-.01
-.00
.00
-.00
Debt-to-equity (P62j)
tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: Firm resources are group mean centered, while strategic group characteristics are
uncentered
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competitive advantage) moderated the influence of physical resources (i.e., capital
intensity) on Altman’s Z (t = -2.52, p<.01). Overall, several moderated relationships
were found significant across performance measures. Thus, mixed evidence is found for
hypothesis 3.
Hypothesis 4 tested the degree to which industry characteristics moderated the
effects o f group characteristics on firm performance. Results for this analysis are
presented in table 15. For financial performance (i.e., ROA), both dynamism and
complexity moderated the influence o f group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive
advantage) on performance (t = -2.69, p<.05 for dynamism and t = 2.26, p<.05 for
complexity) and there is some indication that munificence moderated the relation
between group R&D Intensity and performance (t = -1.75, p<.l).
For market performance (i.e., PE), environmental munificence moderated group
R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage) on performance (t = -2.89, p<.01).
Considering firm survival (i.e., Altman’s Z), all environmental dimensions (i.e.,
munificence, dynamism, and complexity) approached or reached significance for the
effect o f group R&D Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage on performance; t =
-1.86, p<.l for munificence; t = -1.71, p<.l for dynamism; t = 1.99, p<.05 for
complexity). In sum, several moderated relationships for each type o f performance (i.e.,
financial, market, and organizational survival) were significant (7 out of 30 possible;
23.3%), providing mixed evidence in support o f hypothesis 4.
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Table 15. Test of Industry (i.e., moderation) Effects on Group Characteristics
(t-values)
ROA

ROI

ROE

Munificence
.27
-1.42
-.23
R&D Intensity (you)
-.79
-.69
-1.75+
Trademarks (7021)
Dynamism
-.40
-.36
R&D Intensity (yoi2> -2.69*
.27
.54
-.12
Trademarks (yo22)
Complexity
-.04
2.26*
-.57
R&D Intensity (you)
-.16
.97
-.06
Trademarks (yo23)
+p<0.l *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: strategic group characteristics are group mean
characteristics are uncentercd

PE

Altman’s Z

-.61
-2.89**

- 1.86 +
-.25

-.49
-.18

-1.71 +
-.71

.28
.06

1.99*
.28

centered, while industry

(Coefficients)
ROA

ROI

ROE

PE

Altman’s Z

Munificence
-.77
1.53
-7.79
-1.49
-1.77+
R&D Intensity (you)
-1.77
-1.52
-2.84**
-.09
-2.26+
Trademarks (yo2i)
Dynamism
-63.83
-53.65
-33.08
-44.71 +
R&D Intensity (yoi2) -256.22*
4.84
-1.26
9.39
-1.39
-2.12
Trademarks (yo22)
Complexity
15.00*
-.49
-5.83
1.28
3.58*
R&D Intensity (you)
-.12
-.53
2.74
.08
.14
Trademarks (yo23)
tp<0.1 *p<0.05 **p<0.01 ***p<0.001
Note: strategic group characteristics are group mean centered, while industry
characteristics are uncentered
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Discussion
Considerable effort in strategic management research has focused on
understanding the influence o f two levels o f analysis - firms and industries - on firm
performance. Results o f this study suggest that understanding group phenomena is also
critical for both empirical study as well as managerial attention. In the following sections
I discuss the role played by multiple levels o f influence on firm performance.
Multiple Performance Influences
Understanding the influences of firm performance is at the heart of strategic
management (Keats & Hitt, 1988). A complete understanding requires integration of
both resource-based and industrial organizational economic approaches to organizations
(Collis, 1991). Accordingly, this study provides a comprehensive exploration o f this
approach by testing firm, strategic group, and industry influences on firm performance.
The addition of the group level o f analysis builds on considerable research investigating
firm and industry influences on firm performance (e.g., Brush & Bromiley, 1997; Brush
et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998; McGahan & Porter, 1997; Powell, 1996;
Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985). Two main findings emerge
from the variance decomposition tests. First, significant variance exists at each level of
analysis. Second, the amount o f variance explained in firm performance is partially a
function o f how performance is conceptualized and defined. Next, I discuss these
findings for each level o f analysis (i.e., firms, strategic groups, and industries).
Overall, results indicate that managers’ actions to uniquely position their firms in
the market is a more powerful influence on firm performance than strategic group or
industry effects. Relative to previous research, the results o f this study found a much
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stronger firm effect and therefore supports others who find the majority of variance in
firm performance can be attributed to unique firm effects (e.g., Mauri & Michaels, 1998).
However, these results are at odds with others who have detected marginal firm effects.
For example, the 65% o f the variation in financial performance (i.e., ROA) found here is
considerably larger than Schmalensee’s (1985) negligible corporate effect, Wemerfelt
and Montgomery’s (1988) 2.6% variance explained by firm diversification, and
somewhat larger than Rumelt’s (1991) 46% variation at the business level.
Several factors may account for the considerably larger amount of variance in
performance at the firm level of analysis found in this study. One interpretation for this
finding is that the use o f the lagged time structure played a key role. The importance of
time has been demonstrated by Rumelt (1991), who replicated an earlier work by
Schmalensee (1985) using the same sample but multiple years o f data and detected a
considerably larger firm business effect (46% o f the variation as compared to a negligible
effect for Schmalensee). Another reason may be the decision to only sample single
business firms. For example, McGahan and Porter (1997) did not include single business
firms in their sample and found 31.71% o f the variance was due to business segment
effects while Mauri and Michaels (1998) relied exclusively on nondiversified firms and
found as much as 36.9% o f the variation was due to firm effects.
The HLM method used in this study also influenced study outcomes for multiple
reasons. The variance components methods used by others used a series o f nested
ANOVA techniques to estimate multiple influences on firm performance. This
estimation strategy has several undesirable limitations. For example, McGahan and
Porter (1997) note that by not simultaneously estimating multiple effects, this
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computational disadvantage introduces considerable “noise” into study findings. This
has been demonstrated by findings that “error” makes up between 8.7% and 68 .8 % o f the
variance in performance (cf. Mauri & Michaels, 1998; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt,
1991). By simultaneous estimation, the HLM method uses the variation in performance
found at each level o f analysis to partition variance (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992). Thus,
no "error” variance remains after the variance components are estimated (Bryk &
Raudenbush, 1992). The use o f such methods results in considerable parsimony in
estimation procedures as compared to other studies testing similar relationships in the
strategy literature. For example, Rumelt’s fixed-effects ANOVA analysis necessitated
the use o f over 10,000 degrees o f freedom while McGahan and Porter (1997) required
over 50,000 degrees o f freedom for their tests. In contrast, the HLM procedure used to
test variance decomposition in this study required only 36 degrees o f freedom. While the
computation advantages o f iterative HLM techniques are well-documented (Du Toit,
1995; Goldstein, 1986; Longford, 1987), this is the first study in the strategy literature to
take advantage o f such advancements.
The amount o f variation in firm performance at each level o f analysis varied
markedly based on how performance was conceptualized (i.e., financial, market,
survival) as well as operationalized. Among financial indicators o f performance, 65.82%
o f the variation in ROA was at the firm level, compared to 86.53% for ROI and 90.57%
for ROE. For both market performance (i.e., price-eamings ratio) and survival (i.e.,
Altman’s Z), even more o f the variation was attributable to the firm level o f analysis. For
market performance, 95.74% o f the variation in PE was at the firm level. Similarly,
96.08% o f Altman’s Z (i.e., organizational survival) resides at the firm level. Findings
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from these measures provide even stronger support for the idea that unique firm
differences are the most critical driver o f firm performance.
Conceptual as well as empirical explanations exist for why market performance
and organizational were survival largely driven by firm, as opposed to group or industry
phenomena. Market performance in this study was operationalized as the price-eamings
ratio. Empirically, there is considerable variability in this measure within industries
because a modest edge in earnings growth can results in a substantially higher multiple
increase (Fridson, 1995). Conceptually, firm level decisions such as erratic changes in
strategy also influence this measure substantially (Fridson, 1995). Similarly,
organizational survival via bankruptcy is also subject to considerable discretion of
individual firms. Once viewed as a sign of managerial failure, bankruptcy is becoming
more accepted as a shrewd strategy for turnaround as 1978 legislation allows even
solvent firms to take advantage o f this legal maneuver (Tavakolian, 1995).
Although the majority o f the variance in firm performance was attributable to the
firm level o f analysis, the influence o f strategic groups was in several cases, considerable.
Specifically, this study found that the addition of the strategic group level o f analysis
accounted for roughly 15% o f the variance in the most commonly operationalized
measure of firm performance - ROA. This component is comparable to the amount of
variance many studies have found for the industry influence on performance (e.g., Mauri
& Michaels, 1998; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Wemerfelt & Montgomery,
1988) and more than what others found for firm effects (e.g., Schmalensee, 1985). This
finding is also larger than the 8% o f variance in firm performance found by Ketchen and
colleagues (1997) meta-analytic review o f the influence o f organizational configurations
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and performance. While some researchers have argued that firm, group, and industry
context are all important for understanding firm performance, this is the first study to
simultaneously test each o f these components. The results from the variance
decomposition suggest that previous researchers may have underspecified their models
when conducting tests o f the organization-environment interface, limiting our “true”
understanding o f firm performance.
Industry also consistently explained a significant component in the variance in
firm performance. As with the firm and group effects, the amount o f variance explained
was a function o f how performance was conceptualized. While industry effects
accounted for between 10 and 20% o f the variance in financial performance (i.e., ROA,
ROI, ROE), a much smaller influence was found for other types of performance.
Specifically, only 2.41% o f the variance in market performance (i.e., price-eamings ratio)
and 1.33% o f the variance in organizational survival (i.e., Altman’s Z) was at the industry
level o f analysis. This suggests that while the industry level of analysis is considerable
for financial performance, its influence on market performance and survival is less
impressive. Thus, the conclusion that industry effects are the primary influence on firm
performance found by many studies may be overstated.
A substantially larger amount of variation in firm performance was found when
performance was operationalized by measures beyond ROA. Indeed, at least 20% more
variation was estimated at the firm level using other performance measures. The call for
multiple measures o f firm performance is not new to the field. Indeed, more than a
decade ago Venkatraman and Ramanujam (1986) specifically called for
operationalizations o f firm performance beyond accounting based measures.
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Despite the plea to move beyond accounting based performance measures, most
studies o f firm and industry influences on performance continue to rely solely on ROA as
the dependent measure o f performance (e.g., Brush et al., 1999; Mauri & Michaels, 1998;
McGahan & Porter, 1997; Roquebert et al., 1996; Rumelt, 1991; Schmalensee, 1985).
Findings from this study provide empirical evidence that this practice should be
abandoned as it obscures differences that may be understood by profiling other salient
performance types and measures. For example, more than twice the variance in both
group and industry levels is found for ROA compared to other performance measures.
This may be driven by the influence of assets - a generally accepted measure of firm size
(cfi, Weinzimmer et al., 1998). The influence o f size has been demonstrated to be a
strategic group mobility barrier that influences firm performance (Lewis & Thomas,
1990; Porter, 1979). As well, size has also been argued to be an industry entry barrier
that influences firm performance (cf. Porter, 1980). In sum, results o f this study support
the notion that the complexity o f organizational performance can only be understood
through rich conceptualizations o f the performance construct beyond financial returns
such as ROA (Hubbard & Bromiley, 1995).
Group Main Effects
Results o f the variance decomposition just discussed point to the important, yet
often overlooked role played by the strategic group level o f analysis in explaining
variation in firm performance. These results focused on the extent of the level’s
influence but not on how the strategic group level impacts performance. This dissertation
also examined the nature o f strategic group influences on performance by identifying
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group characteristics believed to predict variance in firm performance above and beyond
the effects o f firm resources.
Across financial performance (i.e., ROA, ROI, ROE) and organizational survival
(i.e., Altman’s Z), there was a significant negative relationship between group R&D
Intensity (i.e., source o f competitive advantage) and firm performance above and beyond
any effect detected for firm resources. This suggests that irrespective of industry types,
strategic groups that are characterized by efficiency (i.e., K-strategists) outperform other
groups. For financial performance (i.e., ROA), there was also a significant positive effect
for group trademarks (i.e., breadth o f operations). In tandem with the negative significant
effect for group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive advantage) found for ROA,
even more specific findings can be presented for this performance measure. That is,
controlling for firm resource effects, the most high performing firms in terms o f ROA
focus on high domain breadth (i.e., trademarks) while maximizing efficiency (i.e., low
source of competitive advantage as measured by group R&D Intensity). In terms o f the
Zammuto (1988) framework, these firms would be labeled as analyzers.
Overall, these findings provide a rigorous test o f strategic group influences while
controlling for resource-based explanations. By doing so, this study overcomes common
criticisms o f strategic groups research. The groups, defined by theoretical rationale,
clearly differed in terms of performance. Also, results o f this test answer the call o f those
who have explicitly advocated the analysis o f group influences after controlling for
resource-based explanations (Dranove et al., 1998). Hence, these significant findings
may be used to improve our understanding o f group influences on performance.
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Group Moderation Effects
Results o f the strategic groups analysis also suggest that group characteristics
moderate the relationship between resource holdings and performance. Hence, this
research builds on the work o f others (e.g., Reger & Huff, 1993) who have argued that
positioning within a strategic group is an important aspect o f organizational strategy and
firm performance. Specifically, results from this study suggest that the strength o f the
relation between firm resources and performance is often dependent on characteristics of
the strategic group.
Several significant cases existed where strategic group characteristics moderated
the effects o f firm resources on firm performance. For example, in groups with high
levels of R&D Intensity (i.e., innovation focus), the relationship between intangible
resources and performance (i.e., ROA) was weaker than in groups with low levels of
R&D Intensity (i.e., efficiency focus). A similar result was obtained for market
performance. Also for market performance, managing physical resources (i.e.,
percentage of foreign sales) was more important for groups with fewer trademarks (i.e.,
niche groups) than groups with many trademarks (i.e., large operations breadth). Finally,
for organizational survival, managing physical resources (i.e., capital intensity) is more
important for firms with low group R&D Intensity (i.e., efficiency focus) than those with
high group R&D Intensity (i.e., innovation focus). Overall, 9 o f the 60 possible
moderated relationships (15%) were significant.
The existence o f such moderated relationships suggests that attaining superior
performance is a complex process that involves understanding resource-based advantages
that might accrue in the context o f the specific group strategy that a firm is pursuing.
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Consequently, managers must not only be aware o f critical resources that may influence
firm performance in their industry, but also how the efficacy o f those resources may be
enhanced or diminished by strategic group membership. This suggests that
understanding performance vis-a-vis the resource-based view o f the firm can not be
accomplished by examining a firm’s idiosyncratic resources alone. In contrast, managers
need to be keenly aware o f groups operating in their industry, and how those groups
might change the effectiveness of certain resources. Only then, can managers uniquely
position themselves in their competitive environments.
Industry Moderation Effects
The idea that environmental context influences organizational performance has
been long accepted in the field. Many researchers have discussed the considerable role
that environments play in affecting firm performance (e.g., Bain, 1956; Porter, 1981).
More specifically, researchers have argued that key industry characteristics such as
munificence, dynamism, and complexity be examined in strategy studies (Dess et al.,
1990). Typically, studies have modeled the effects of industry as a direct influence on
firm performance. This study adds to understanding of firm performance by testing the
influence o f industry characteristics on relations between strategic group membership and
performance. Results o f these tests shed light on how environmental context changes the
influence of strategic group membership on performance.
A negative moderated relationship was detected between environmental
dynamism and the efficacy o f group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive
advantage) on financial performance (i.e., ROA). In dynamic environments, the
relationship between efficiency focus (i.e., low group R&D Intensity) and performance is
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weaker than in stable environments. Coupled with results from hypothesis 2 (firms in
groups focusing on efficiency outperform firms in groups focusing on innovation) these
results provide evidence for Bums and Stalker’s (1961) structural contingency assertion
that success o f organizational types is a function o f environmental conditions. Indeed,
their “mechanistic” organizations who focus on task specialization and technical
improvements are much akin to “K-specialist” firms in terms o f Zammuto’s (1988)
categories based on strategic choice and population ecology literatures. As well, Bums
and Stalker’s “organic” organizational forms that constantly tackle fresh problems with
unforeseen requirements are similar to population ecologists “r-specialists” who
continually search for the new opportunities in their competitive environments. Given
the strong tie between the findings o f this study and theoretical basis found in the
population ecology literature, perhaps it is not surprising that this finding also approached
significance for organizational survival (i.e., Altman’s Z).
For market performance (i.e., price-eamings ratio), there was a significant
negative moderated relationship between environmental munificence and group
trademarks (i.e., breadth o f operations breath). Thus, as munificence increases the
relationship between group operations breadth and performance weakens. This
relationship also approached significance for financial performance (i.e., ROA). Results
from hypothesis 2 detected a significant main effect between group trademarks (i.e.,
breadth o f operations) and performance in terms o f ROA. The significant negative
moderated effect o f munificence suggests that this relationship weakens when there is
less environmental resource abundance (i.e., munificence is low). These results provide
empirical support for Ketchen and colleagues (1993) who speculated that low
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munificence would favor specialist groups (i.e., entrepreneurs and defenders) over
generalist groups (i.e., prospectors and analyzers).
Finally, a positive moderated relationship was detected between environmental
complexity and group R&D Intensity (i.e., source of competitive advantage) for both
financial performance (i.e., ROA) and organizational survival (i.e., Altman’s Z). Thus,
while significant main effects found in tests o f hypothesis 2 suggested that K-specialists
(i.e., defenders and analyzers) tended to outperform r-specialists (i.e., entrepreneurs and
prospectors), this relationship becomes even stronger as complexity decreases (i.e.,
industry concentration increases).
Summary and Conclusion
This study builds on others who argue that competitive advantage results from a
series o f connected decisions based on complex relationships between factors found at
multiple levels o f analysis (e.g., Stimpert & Duhaime, 1997a). A conventional
interpretation o f the results o f the variance components analysis might conclude that
because most o f the variation exists at the firm level, that firm uniqueness is the critical
area that “drives” firm performance differences. Such an interpretation tells only a
portion o f the story. Attaining superior performance is a complex process that requires
an intimate understanding o f industry environments, similarly acting competitors, and a
firm’s uniqueness. Given this premise, the driving characteristic o f firm performance is
positioning within both group and industry. Here, firm uniqueness is certainly key, but
only when managers have a keen understanding o f their industry environments and
strategic group processes present in those environments.
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This study’s inclusion o f multiple measures allows for rich comparison across
indicators o f performance, and may serve to challenge previous study findings. For
example, results of this study found that the firm level o f analysis explained most o f the
variation in firm performance across performance measures. As well, a significant
amount o f variation in performance was detected at the firm, group, and industry levels
across performance measures. The amount of variation, however, varied considerably
among levels and performance measures. Most notably, when industry effects were
measured in terms o f nonfinancial measures, their influence was considerably less than
results found by previous researchers. While calls for the use o f such performance
measures are not new to the strategy field (cf., Venkatraman & Ramanujam, 1986),
response to such calls has been slow. Future research could extend findings from this
study by looking at other nonconventional performance measures. For example,
economic value added has recently emerged as one o f the more salient performance
measures used to assess organizational performance by top executives (Bontis,
Dragonetti, Jacobsen, & Roos, 1999). As well, corporate social performance is also a
salient measure for many firms (Agle, Mitchell, & Sonnenfeld, 1999; Ruf, Muralidhar, &
Paul, 1998; Waddock & Graves, 1997). The inclusion o f such performance measures
may provide additional insights in future inquiries.
In Rumelt’s (1991) often-cited study of firm and industry influences on firm
performance he asks the question, “how much does industry matter?” This study builds
upon considerable research into influences on firm performance by asking, “how much
do strategic groups matter?” The answer to this question may largely be in the eye o f the
beholder. On the one hand, group characteristics explained variation in firm performance
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above and beyond firm resources and moderated the efficacy o f other resource holdings.
Despite this influence, most o f the variation was at the firm, not industry or group, level
o f analysis. Overall, results suggest that firms’ unique positioning both within their
groups as well as industries is the most critical aspect that “drives” firm performance.
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CONCLUSION
This dissertation incorporates insights from the resource-based view, strategic
groups research, and industrial organizational economics to improve understanding o f the
determinants o f organizational performance. Conceptual foundations suggested that
understanding each view is necessary to fully comprehend the determinants of
organizational performance. Results from both empirical studies validate this argument.
In both the hospital sample, as well as the multi-industry sample, variation in
organizational performance was detected at both the organizational and group levels o f
analysis. While both resource-based and strategic group explanations enhance
understandings o f organizational performance, this dissertation supports the notion that
firm uniqueness is the key driver of performance. That is, how managers uniquely
position their organization within their industry, as well as within a group o f similarly
acting competitors, is the critical determinant o f organizational functioning.
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APPENDIX A: HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING
PROCEDURE FOR HOSPITAL DATA
The Hierarchical Linear Modeling (HLM) methodology used in this study
involves a two-level approach (cf. Hofmann & Stetzer, 1998). The first level examines
relationships among variables within strategic groups that generate intercept and slope
parameters linking the within-group independent variables (i.e., hospital resources) to the
outcome measure for each group (i.e., hospital performance). This model is analogous to
the familiar linear regression, although the Bayes algorithm used to estimate the level-1
components is noted for its superior precision and reliability (Bryk & Raudenbush, 1992;
Morris, 1983). The HLM algorithm is able to provide better estimates of the predictors
o f hospital outcomes within strategic groups by “borrowing” information about these
relationships from other groups and hospitals (cf. Bryk, Raudenbush, & Congdon, 1996).
fn the level-2 model, the intercept and slope parameters are used as outcome variables
and regressed on between-groups variables.
When estimated without predictor variables, the level-2 model is essentially a
one-way analysis o f variance (Hofmann, 1997). The HLM ANOVA model was used to
test hypothesis I that investigates the amount o f performance explained by organizational
and group levels. This is accomplished by partitioning variance into within (i.e.,
hospital) and between (i.e., strategic group effect) group components (cf. Bryk &
Raudenbush, 1992; Hofmann, 1997). The following set of equations will be estimated to
conduct the variance partitioning in HLM:
Level-1: Performance,y = |3oy + Hj
Level-2: p0y = Yoo + U oj
Where Performance^ is the performance measure o f a single dependent variable (e.g.,
ROA) for hospital / in group j . p0y is the mean performance for group J, and y00 is the
grand mean performance (i.e., the mean of group means). In this set of equations, the
level- 1 equation includes no predictors and, therefore, the regression equation only
includes an intercept estimate. The level-2 model regresses each strategic group’s mean
performance onto a constant; that is, Poy is regressed onto a unit vector resulting in a yoo
parameter equal to the grand mean performance (i.e., the mean o f group means, Poy). The
level-1 residual (i.e., r,y) represents within group variance in performance. The level-2
residual (i.e., Uoj) represents any between group variance in performance. By calculating
a ratio o f the between group variance divided by the total variance in performance, HLM
provides information on the percentage of the total variance in performance residing both
within and between strategic groups (cf. Hofmann, 1997).
In addition to the ability to estimate variance components at multiple levels o f
analysis (i.e., hypothesis 1), HLM is also able to test the effects o f multiple independent
variables at each level. This feature is used to test hypothesis 2, which argues that
strategic group characteristics have a direct affect on firm performance (above and
beyond hospital resources). This was tested by adding strategic group level measures
(i.e., group operations breadth and source o f competitive advantage; y0i and 702) at level-2
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to predict group performance (Poy). This can be specified with the following set o f
equations:
Level-1: Performance,y= Poy + Piy (Capital Spending//) + P2y(Urban/Suburban//) + P3y
(Direct Medical Expenses//) + p4y(Ageij) + Psy(Current Ratio//) + p6y(Debt-to-totalassetsij) + r,y
Level-2: poy = yoo + Yoi (Percent routine patient days/) + 702 (Number of services/) + Uoj
HLM provides a /-test for each level-2 parameter. This tests if each of the strategic group
characteristics (i.e., yoi and 702) has a significant main effect on performance
{Performance!j). If so, then firm performance can be explained by group characteristics.
It is worth noting that when using HLM, variable “centering” affects substantive
conclusions that can be drawn from empirical tests (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998; Kreft, De
Leeuw, & Aiken, 1995). To control for level-1 variables, they are first “centered” around
their grand means (Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). For example, when testing hypothesis 3,
the level-1 variable that measures capital expenditures (e.g., Piy Capital Spending//) is
modeled by subtracting the grand mean capital spending from the individual hospital’s
spending so that the ievel-l variable is now modeled as p iy(Capital Spending// - Capital
Spending ..) where Capital Spending.. represents the grand mean capital spending. Other
independent variables are modeled in the same manner.
Hypotheses 3 argues that strategic group characteristics moderate relationships
between firm resources and performance. This was tested by adding strategic group level
measures at level-2 to predict significant independent variables at level-1. This is
illustrated with the following set of equations:
Level-1: Performance,y= poy + Piy (Capital Spending//) + P2y(Urban/Suburban//) + P37
(Direct Medical Expenses//) + p4y (Age//) + Psy (Current Ratio//) + p6y(Debt-to-totalassetsz/) + r ,7
Level-2: Poy = 700 + Yoi (Percent routine patient days/) + 702 (Number of services/) + Uoj
Piy = Y10 + 711 (Percent routine patient days/) + 712 (Number of services/)
P2y = 720 + 721 (Percent routine patient days/) + 722 (Number of services/)
Psy = 730 + 731 (Percent routine patient days/) + 732 (Number of services/)
P4y = 740 + 741 (Percent routine patient days/) + 742 (Number of services/)
Psy = 750 + Y5i (Percent routine patient days/) + 752 (Number of services/)
Poy = 760 + 761 (Percent routine patient days/) + y62 (Number of services/)
The prediction o f Piy - p6y by level-2 variables results in interaction terms that are
estimates o f cross-level effects. To test level-2 moderation, level-1 variables are
“centered” around their group means. When group mean centering is used, significant
level-2 variables indicate moderating or cross-level effects o f strategic group
characteristics on the firm resource—performance relationships examined at level-1 (cf.
Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
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In sum, HLM allows for tests of (1) the amount o f variance in hospital
performance explained by organization uniqueness versus strategic group membership,
(2) the main effects o f strategic group characteristics on hospital performance and (3) the
moderating role o f strategic group characteristics on hospital resource-performance
relationships.
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APPENDIX B: HIERARCHICAL LINEAR MODELING PROCEDURE FOR
COMPUSTAT DATA
A three level HLM model was used to test the effects o f firms (level-1) nested
within strategic groups (level-2) nested within industries (level-3). The simplest threelevel model is a fully unconditional model (i.e., no predictors at any level). This model
represents how variation in performance is allocated across the different levels o f analysis
(i.e., firm, strategic group, industry).
The level-1 model represents the performance for each firm as a function o f a
strategic group mean plus random error using the following equation:
Performance jjk = Tt0jk + Cijk,
where Performance^ is the average performance for a single dependent variable (e.g.,
ROA) o f firm / in strategic group j and industry k; Tc0jk is the mean performance of
strategic group j in industry k\ e ^ is a random “firm effect” that measures the deviation of
firm ijk’s score from the strategic group mean. These effects are assumed normally
distributed with a mean o f 0 and variance a 2. The subscripts i j , and k denote firms,
strategic groups, and industries where there are / = 1,2 ,..., % firms within strategic group
j in industry k ; j = 1,2,...^/* strategic groups within industry k; an d £ = 1,2,..., K
industries.
The level-2 model examines each strategic group mean, ttojk as an outcome
varying randomly around some industry mean using the following formula:
Ttojk = Pook+ rqjk»

where pook is the mean performance in industry k; r0jk is a random “strategic group
effect,” that is, the deviation o f strategic group Jk’s mean from the industry mean. These
effects are assumed normally distributed with a mean of 0 and variance x*. Within each
o f the K industries, the variability among strategic groups is assumed the same.
The level-3 model represents the variability among industries. The industry
mean, Pook, varies randomly around a grand mean as presented in the following formula:
Pook = YOOO + Wook,

where yooo is the grand mean; «ook is the random “industry effect,” that is, the deviation of
industry k's mean from the grand mean. These effects are assumed normally distributed
with a mean o f 0 and variance xp.
This simple three-level model partitions the total variability in the outcome
Performancep into its three components: (level-1) among firms within strategic groups,
cr; (level-2) among strategic groups within industries, x*; and (level-3) among
industries, xp. This partitioning allows for estimates o f the proportion o f variation that is
within strategic groups, among strategic groups within industries, and among industries.
Specifically,
a 2/ (a 2 + x* + xp) is the proportion o f variance within strategic groups;
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fit / (cr2+t„ + ip) is the proportion o f variance among strategic groups within industries;
and
xp / (a 2+xs + tp) is the proportion o f variance among industries.
Tliis fully unconditional model allows for estimation o f variability associated with each
o f the three levels (i.e., firms, strategic groups, industries). This model provides for a
direct test of hypothesis 1.
In addition to the ability to estimate variance components at multiple levels of
analysis (i.e., hypothesis 1), HLM is also able to test the effects of multiple independent
variables at each level. This feature is used to test hypothesis 2, which argues that
strategic group characteristics have a direct affect on firm performance above and beyond
firm resources. This was tested by adding strategic group level measures (i.e., group
operations breadth and source o f competitive advantage; poij and p02j) at level-2 to predict
group performance (tiojk)- This is illustrated by the following equation:
Performance^ = rcojk + ftijk (Capital Intensity)^ + 7t2jk (Percent Foreign Sales)jjk + 7t3jk
(Patents )ijk + rc4jk (Reputation)^ + 7i5jk (Current Ratio)^ + 7t6jk(Debt-to-equity)ijk + enk,
n0jk = Pooj + Poij(R&D Intensity)// + Po2j(Trademarks)// + r0y
Pook = Yooo + t^OOk

HLM provides a /-test for each level-2 parameter. It is worth noting that when using
HLM, centering decisions effect the substantive conclusions drawn from empirical tests
(Hofmann & Gavin, 1998). To model the incremental effect of group characteristics
beyond individual firm resources, level-1 variables are centered around their grand means
(Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
Hypotheses 3 argues that strategic group characteristics moderate relationships
between firm resources and performance. This was tested by adding strategic group level
measures at level-2 to predict significant independent variables at level-1. This is
illustrated by the following equation:
Performanceyk = ttojk + ttijk (Capital Intensity)^ + rr^k (Percent Foreign Sales)jjk + ^ k
(Patents)ijk + rtyk (Reputation)jjk + rtsjk (Current Ratio)^ + n6j (Debt-to-equity)jjk + e ^ ,

7tojk = Pooj + Poij(R&D Intensity)//
7xijk = Pioj + Pnj(R&D Intensity)//
7t 2jk = P20J + P2ij(R&D Intensity)//
7t 3jk = P30J + p3ij(R&D Intensity)//
7r4jk = P4oj + p4ij(R&D Intensity)//
iT5jk = Psoj + Psij(R&D Intensity)//

+
+
+
+
+
+
7r6jk = Peoj + p6ij(R&D Intensity)// +

Po2j(Trademarks)// + r0ij
p^(Trademarks)//
P22j(Trademarks)//
P32j(Trademarks)//
p42j(Trademarks)//
Ps2j(Trademarks)//
p62j(Trademarks)//

Pook = Yooo + f^OOk
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Level-l variables must be “centered” around their group means for significant level-2
variables to indicate a moderating or cross level effect (cf. Hofmann & Gavin, 1998).
Hypothesis 4 argues that industry characteristics moderate the relationship
between strategic group characteristics and performance. To test this hypothesis,
industry predictors at level-3 (i.e., munificence, dynamism, complexity) are used to
predict group characteristics (i.e., pooj, poij and po2j) at level-2. Thus, the following
additional equations are measured:
Performance ijk = Kojk + Cjjk,
Ttojk=Pooj + Poij(R&D Intensity)// + Po2j(Trademarks)//' + r0jj
Pooj = Yooo + Yooi (Munificence) + 7002 (Dynamism) + Y003 (Complexity) + U00k
Pou = Y010 + Yoi 1(Munificence) + Y012 (Dynamism) + yon (Complexity)
Po2j = Y020 + Y021 (Munificence) + Y022 (Dynamism) + Y023 (Complexity)
Note that the equations estimating Poij and Po2j at level-3 are nonrandomly varying (i.e.,
the U parameters are not estimated). Thus, I make the assumption that munificence,
dynamism, and complexity “capture” the industry construct (c.f. Dess et al., 1990).
In sum, HLM allows for tests o f ( 1) the amount o f variance in firm performance
explained by firms, strategic groups, and industries (2) the main effects o f strategic group
characteristics on performance controlling for firm resources ( 3) the moderating role of
strategic group characteristics on firm resource-performance relationships, and (4) the
moderating role o f industry characteristics on strategic group characteristic —
performance relationships.
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